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The parties to this action are Respondent Commercial Security
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Appellant Merrill Bean Chevrolet, a Delaware Corporation, referred
to herein as "Merrill Bean."
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STATEMENT Of ISSUES

The Bank contends t h a t t h e i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d by t h i s appeal
are as follows:
1.

Whether t h e Bank had an a b s o l u t e c o n t r a c t u r a l r i g h t

d i s c o n t i n u e purchase of M e r r i l l B e a n ' s a u t o m o b i l e d e a l e r

to

contracts

of s a l e ( " d e a l e r paper") under t h e terms of t h e agreements between
the parties;
2.

Whether t h e i n c e n t i v e c l a u s e i n t h e Loan Committment

L e t t e r of J u l y 1 9 , 1967 was a c o n d i t i o n for making of t h e l o a n t o
M e r r i l l Bean and whether s a i d c l a u s e i s v i o l a t i v e of t h e Sherman
A n t i - T r u s t Act and t h e Bank Holding Company Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C.
Sec. 1972;
3.

Whether t h e Bank f by d i s c o n t i n u i n g p u r c h a s e of M e r r i l l

B e a n ' s d e a l e r p a p e r , made i t i m p o s s i b l e for M e r r i l l Bean t o perform
i n such a manner as t o r e a l i z e t h e 1/2% lower mortgage r a t e under
t h e terms of t h e Loan Committment L e t t e r , excusing M e r r i l l Bean from
i t s o b l i g a t i o n a t a 7% r a t e ; and f
4.

Whether M e r r i l l B e a n ' s d e f e n s e s t o t h e B a n k ' s c l a i m s a r e

b a r r e d i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y by t h e d o c t r i n e of i n t e g r a t i o n and t h e
a p p l i c a b l e S t a t u t e of F r a u d s .

STATUTESr fiULES AND ORDINANCES
RELIED UPQN
Respondent argues and relies upon the following statutes,
rules and ordinances in the casef each being contained in full text
in Appendix A-9 hereto:

UTAH CODE ANN. Section 25-5-1;
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 25-5-4;
12 U.S.C. Section 1972.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Commercial Security Bank, filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Relief in the District Court of Weber County dated the
11th day of March, 1986, asking the Court to interpret the meaning
and effect of a Trust Deed Notef a Trust Deedf and a Letter
Agreement dated July 19, 1967.

Respondent Bank sent Interrogatories

and then took the deposition of J. Merrill Beanr who is appellant
Merrill Bean Chevrolet's Chief Executive Officer and by stipulation
his deposition was published and made a part of the record.

The

Bank then filed its Motion for Summary Judgment which was heard by
the Honorable David E. Rothf District Judge, on the 22nd day of
August, 1986.
After a Motion for Clarification, the Court entered the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of the
the Bank as prayed in its Complaint dated the 10th day of December,
1986, and Notice of Appeal was filed January 8, 19 87.

The Docketing

Statement was filed the 28th day of January, 1987, and thereafter

the Bank filed a Motion for Summary Affirmance and Merrill Bean
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and both Motions were denied
on the 25th day of Februaryf 1987.
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Respondent Commercial Security Bank adopts as the statement
of facts the Findings of Fact rendered by the District Court herein,
as follows:
1.

Commercial Security Bank loaned the sum of $400,000.00 to

Merrill Bean Chevrolet on or about July 19, 1967 under the terms of
a loan commitment letter of that date (Finding of Fact No. 1; Record
on Appeal at 164-165).
2.

Said loan commitment letter of July 19, 1967 provided for

said loan of $400,000.00 at a 7% rate of interest with a 20 year
amortization repayment program.

One of the terms of that agreement

provided specifically as follows:

"The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to
6.5 percent in consideration of the maintenance by you of
your commercial checking account with the Bank and the
offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy
of said Bank * * *. "
(Finding of Fact No. 2; Record on Appeal at 165) .
3.

Subsequent to 1967, the plaintiff discontinued purchase

of automobile dealer contracts including those of Merrill Bean
Chevrolet.

Merrill Bean Chevrolet later withdrew its checking

account from the Bank and the Bank seeks to enforce the 7% rather
than 6.5 % interest rate on the loan (Finding of Fact No. 3; Record
on Appeal at 165).

4.

The a d d i t i o n a l amount of payments remaining a t the

maturity of the o b l i g a t i o n a t the 7% i n t e r e s t r a t e t o t a l in excess
of $24,000.00 and as prayed in the Bank's complaint (Finding of Fact
No, 4; Record on Appeal at 165).
5.

There i s no evidence t h a t the 7% i n t e r e s t r a t e i s an

unreasonable r a t e considering t h e time a t which t h i s loan was made
and t h e circumstances under which the t r a n s a c t i o n was consummated
(Finding of Fact No. 5; Record on Appeal at 165).
6.

Merrill Bean Chevrolet claims t h a t the Bank's f a i l u r e to

accept i t s dealer paper caused M e r r i l l Bean Chevrolet t o shop
elsewhere for banking s e r v i c e s and t h a t other banks would not
finance i t s dealer paper unless i t t r a n s f e r r e d i t s checking account
t o t h a t bank.

Thusf Merrill Bean Chevrolet argues t h a t i t was

forced t o t r a n s f e r i t s checking account and t h e Bank then increased
t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e t o 7% on t h e loan.

Merrill Bean Chevrolet further

argues t h a t the Bank's refusal to accept i t s dealer paper made i t
impossible for i t t o perform the terms of the contract (Finding of
Fact No. 6; Record on Appeal a t 16 5-16 6 ) .
7.

In a d d i t i o n , Merrill Bean Chevrolet argues t h a t the

Bank's refusal to accept i t s dealer paper made i t impossible for

it

t o perform under the terms of the contract and in a d d i t i o n t o t h e
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of performance argument also argues t h a t the Bank i s
equitably estopped from enforcing t h e higher 7% r a t e against i t .
Merrill Bean Chevrolet also argues t h a t the contract c o n s t i t u t e s an
unlawful "tying agreement" in v i o l a t i o n on t h e Bank Holding Company
Act of 1970 (Finding of Fact No. 7; Record on Appeal at 166).

8,

This o b l i g a t i o n i s secured by a note and deed of t r u s t

upon Merrill Bean C h e v r o l e t ' s d e a l e r s h i p property which, by i t s
terms f affords t h e Bank a power of s a l e upon default (Finding of
Fact No. 8; Record on Appeal at 166) •
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Merrill Bean argues t h a t the Bank breached an agreement
between t h e p a r t i e s e s t a b l i s h e d by course of dealing and acted in
bad f a i t h by u n i l a t e r a l l y changing i t s lending policy to discontinue
purchase of Merrill Bean's automobile dealer c o n t r a c t s ,

forcing

Merrill Bean t o go t o another lender which also required placement
of i t s checking accounts with t h a t lender in order to s e l l

its

dealer paper; and t h a t such event t r i g g e r e d a p p l i c a t i o n of the 7%
mortgage i n t e r e s t r a t e rather than the 6 1/2% r a t e .

Merrill Bean

claims t h e Bank i s thus estopped from applying t h e 7% r a t e to the
mortgage loan.

However, e x p l i c i t w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t s between the

p a r t i e s and p a r t i c u l a r l y the Agreement of January 1, 1966, duly
authenticated in t h e record, governed the terms of dealer paper
purchases and s p e c i f i c a l l y provided t h a t the Bank was not obligated
t o purchase any quantity of dealer paper and t h a t Merrill Bean was
not obligated t o offer any quantity of dealer paper.

The Loan

Committment Letter of July 19, 1967 allowed t h e Bank t o accept only
those dealer c o n t r a c t s which met i t s lending p o l i c y ; t h e Bank's
determination t o discontinue purchase of dealer paper was, by
d e f i n i t i o n , a change in lending policy made in good f a i t h in
response to business and economic conditions beyond the Bank's
control.

The D i s t r i c t Court properly ruled t h a t the Bank had acted

in accordance with the p a r t i e s ' express agreements.

The business arrangement s e t f o r t h in t h e Loan Committment
Letter of July 19, 1967 i s not v i o l a t i v e of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970 or of public p o l i c y .
Merrill Bean argues t h a t the checking account maintenance and the
automobile dealer contract provisions thereof c o n s t i t u t e an unlawful
tying agreement whereby the Bank required M e r r i l l Bean t o use other
banking s e r v i c e s in order to obtain i t s mortgage loan.

The mortgage

loan was granted a t a f l a t 7% r a t e , 20-year term with no mention of
other business, 7% being a standard and favorable r a t e for t h i s type
of loan a t the time i t was made.

The other business provisions came

i n t o play only as an i n c e n t i v e for Merrill Bean t o r e a l i z e a 1/2%
decrease from an already favorable loan r a t e of 7%.

Further, the

provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act argued by Merrill Bean
were not enacted by Congress u n t i l t h r e e (3) years following the
execution of t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n .

However, assuming, arguendo, t h a t

the Act has a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s case, the provisions of the Act
i t s e l f s p e c i f i c a l l y exempt such " t r a d i t i o n a l banking p r a c t i c e s " as
those found i n t h i s case from i t s p r o h i b i t i o n s , and t h e case law
i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e Act, as well as i t s l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y , deems
arrangements of t h i s n a t u r e to be both lawful and wise banking
practices.

F i n a l l y , the Merrill Bean's own o f f i c e r ,

James Merrill

Bean, t e s t i f i e d in h i s deposition t h a t he had no evidence of any
unlawful combination or monopolistic agreement.
Merrill Bean also argues t h a t the Bank's withdrawal from the
dealer paper market rendered i t impossible for i t to perform in such
a manner as t o be able to r e a l i z e the 6 1/2% lower r a t e and argues
t h a t i t should be excused from the 7% o b l i g a t i o n under the defense

of impossibility of performance.

The doctrine has no a p p l i c a t i o n

where the a c t i o n s allegedly hindering performance are a c t i o n s
permitted by the c o n t r a c t .
some degree of w i l l f u l n e s s .

Utah cases further require a showing of
The Bank had an absolute r i g h t to

withdraw from the purchase of dealer paper and Merrill Bean made no
a l l e g a t i o n s of w i l l f u l conduct by the Bank aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y

at

avoiding performance of an agreement with Merrill Bean.
F i n a l l y , the record e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Merrill Bean's defenses
a r e based upon p r e - c o n t r a c t oral n e g o t i a t i o n s which are f by nature
of t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n / barred, as t h e agreements a r e fully

integrated

and t h e subject matter, an i n t e r e s t in real e s t a t e f i s subject t o
the S t a t u t e of Frauds.

The D i s t r i c t Court thus properly concluded

t h a t Merrill Bean, if afforded a t r i a l , could not offer

admissible

evidence supportive of i t s defenses.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE BANK HAD AN ABSOLUTE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM
THE PURCHASE OF MERRILL BEAN'S DEALER PAPER WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE.

Merrill Bean Chevrolet argues under Point I of i t s Brief

that

i t was in fact t h e Bank's breach, contrary to the p a r t i e s ' course of
dealing, in refusing t o purchase any more dealer paper from Merrill
Bean Chevrolet, t h a t caused Merrill Bean Chevrolet's withdrawal of
i t s checking account from the Bank and which occasioned the r e t u r n
of the i n t e r e s t r a t e on t h e loan from 6 1/2 percent t o 7 percent.
In order for Merrill Bean Chevrolet t o successfully claim a
breach by the Bank, i t has t o show the existence of some standard,
c o n t r a c t , or agreement, which e s t a b l i s h e s a duty or agreement

running between the parties in order to claim a breach of that duty
or agreement.
The District Court properly found that the promissory note,
trust deed and loan committment letter were integrated agreements
containing the elements of the transaction (copies of these
operative documents are contained in the Appendix to this Brief)•
Merrill Bean Chevrolet mentions in its Brief the contents of a
contract between the parties dated January 1, 1966 which further
supports the Bank's position.
The purchase of dealer paper generally was subject to that
contract between the parties dated January lf 1966.

At page 17 of

his deposition (which was published by the District Court) James
Merrill Bean authenticated the contract of January 1, 1966, the same
being marked to the deposition as Exhibit 2.

An copy of said

contract is appended hereto as Appendix "A-2" for the Court's
reference.
The course of dealing between these parties concerning

the

purchase of dealer paper was first commenced by a "Recourse Dealer
Purchase Contract" executed September 3, 1965

(Deposition of James

Merrill Bean at page 12; Exhibit 1 to deposition).

Shortly

thereafter Merrill Bean renegotiated the dealer paper purchase
contract and was granted the privilege of selling dealer paper to
the Bank on a non-recourse basis under the terms of the contract of
January 1, 1966 (Deposition of James Merrill Bean at pages 16 to 17;
Exhibit 2 to deposition).

In response to a question commencing at

page 17, line 21 of his deposition James Merrill Bean was unable to
say whether there had been any subsequent contracts under which the

Bank purchased his dealer paper.

Given that deposition testimony

and the demand in the Notice of Deposition (Record on Appeal at 24)
that Mr. Bean bring with him all documents concerning this subject,
the Bank asserts that it was established as a matter of record
discovery that dealer paper purchases at the times in issue in this
action were regulated by the contract of January 1, 1966, which was
authenticated by the testimony of James Merrill Bean.
Under the explicit terms of the Auto Dealer Agreement of
January 1, 1966, it is agreed that "nothing herein shall obligate
the Bank to discount or purchase any contract from the dealer . . .
" and likewise Merrill Bean was under no compulsion to offer any
such contracts to the Bank as the Argument further provides that it
does not "obligate the dealer to offer any contract for sale to the
Bank" (emphasis added).

In regard to this Agreement, it is of

interest to note that Merrill Bean strongly infers in its Brief that
the Bank had an obligation to buy its dealer paper.

Merrill Bean

relies heavily on that assertion in advancing its theories of
estoppel and waiver and its impossibility of performance arguments
later in its Brief, yet it is quite clear that the express agreement
between the parties of the January 1, 1966 Agreement was precisely
the opposite.

Merrill Bean fails to cite to any contract or

agreement which specifically and unequivocably obligated the Bank to
buy its dealer paper and relies instead on vague assertions of a
brief course of dealing.

Conversely, the Bank is able to cite to

the Agreement dated January 1, 1966 wherein the parties were not
obligated to offer or purchase any of the paper; that Agreement
merely regulated the terms of the purchases if such were offered and

purchased. Therefore f the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t the Bank
did not breach the c o n t r a c t s between t h e p a r t i e s was based upon duly
a u t h e n t i c a t e d , clear f and uncontroverted w r i t t e n agreements.
As demonstrated by the uncontroverted Affidavit of Jeff K. Thredgold
(Record on Appeal at 2 7 ) , the Bank's staff economist, f i l e d with the
D i s t r i c t Court, with or without t h e maintenance of the checking
account and other business with the Bank, Merrill Bean Chevrolet
received a very favorable loan a t 7 p e r c e n t .

I t should be noted

t h a t t h i s was a long term loan t h a t s t r e t c h e d over 15 y e a r s , at a
f l a t 7 percent r a t e , during t h e term of which the national prime
r a t e climbed as high as 21+ percent.

Merrill Bean Chevrolet

remained very well protected from radical increases in i n t e r e s t
r a t e s due t o t h i s favorable financing arrangement which was a t a set
r a t e and which was very standard a t the time i t was made.

Affidavit

of Jeff K. Thredgold in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Record on Appeal at 2 7 ) .

Merrill Bean's claim t h a t i t i s

prejudiced by the claim of the Bank i s t h e r e f o r e d i f f i c u l t to accept
as t h e fixed r a t e mortgage served t o shield M e r r i l l Bean Chevrolet
from several radical increases in i n t e r e s t r a t e during t h e term of
the mortgage loan which i s t h e subject of t h i s case.

The economic

fact of the matter i s t h a t the obtainment of t h i s fixed r a t e loan
over a long period of time t o finance a commercial s t r u c t u r e was an
i n c r e d i b l e stroke of good luck and providence in favor of Merrill
Bean Chevrolet.

Contrary to Merrill Bean's argument a t Page 9 of

i t s Brief, the Bank a c t u a l l y earned well under the p r e v a i l i n g r a t e
during much of the term of t h i s loan, even a t

7%, and did not, by

any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , act t o procure unconscionable advantage over

Merrill Bean.

Thereforef the actions of the Bank in respect to this

transaction saved Merrill Bean a great deal of money and the
District Court appropriately found that the Bank had fully performed
its obligations and did so in good faith.
Under Point I of its Brief, Merrill Bean asks the Court to
accept the proposition that other financial institutions in the
Ogden area made the same demands upon Merrill Bean as did the Bank;
i.e., that other financial institutions would not buy Merrill Bean's
dealer paper unless its checking account was also at that financing
institution.

This argument is not relevant to any of the issues

raised in this action as Merrill Bean did not allege that the
requirements of other financial institutions were imposed because of
an unlawful monopolistic agreement between the Bank and other
financing institutions in the Ogden area or that the Bank had any
control whatsoever over the lending policies of its competitors.
The District Court appropriately ignored these unfounded assertions
and rendered a clearly proper ruling based upon law and evidence
before it.
POINT TWO
THE MAINTENANCE OF ITS COMMERCIAL CHECKING ACCOUNT AT THE
BANK AND THE OFFERING OF DEALER CONTRACTS WAS NOT ADDITIONAL
CONSIDERATION FOR THE MAKING OF THE REAL ESTATE LOAN TO THE MERRILL
BEAN CHEVROLET; FURTHER, SUCH ARRANGEMENTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE BANK
HOLDING COMPANY ACT OR THE SHERMAN ANTI TRUST ACT.
One of the most fundamental misunderstandings of Merrill Bean
which was fatal to its position at the District Court is the
assertion which was argued at page 6 of its Memorandum in the

District Court (Record on Appeal at 90) and in its Brief before this
Court that "the Bank insisted that the dealer paper and the checking
account go together as additional consideration for the making of
the real estate loan." Furtherr Merrill Bean argued to the District
Court and argues to this Court that to get the real estate loan, it
had to agree to a "tying arrangement" that was unlawful under the
Sherman Anti Trust Actf and against public policy as illustrated by
future passage of the Bank Holding Act of 1970. (Point VIf
Appellant1s Brief).

The elements of the transaction presented to

the District Court showed that both positions are in error. The
District Court properly concluded that the Bank gave to Merrill Bean
a favorable fixed ratef 7 percent, 20 year mortgage loan without any
requirement for other business whatsoever.

The only occasion that

such other business came into play was as an incentive for Merrill
Bean to realize a 1/2 percent lower rate.

Therefore, the granting

of the loan was not conditioned on any other factor; maintenance of
the checking account and the offering of contracts was only an
incentive for Merrill Bean to realize an even more favorable 6 1/2
percent rate under the already favorable 7 percent rate.
Merrill Bean argues the 1970 revision to the Bank Holding
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 1972 (Point IV, page 16, Appellant's
Brief) also places great emphasis on the case of Costner vs. Blount
National Bank, 578 F. 2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978) as it did at the
District Court.

The provisions of 12 U.S.C. Section 1972 are not applicable
to the instant case as the contract which Merrill Bean claims
offends the provisions of the Act was made and executed three years
prior to the enactment of the law.

In an attempt to cure that

problem in the application of the lawf Merrill Bean argues that that
Court should apply a retroactive public policy determination

in

finding the Bank's loan committment contract to be offensive to the
anti-tie-down provisions of the Actf or that the Act should be
applied to the term of the agreements beyond 1970 (Point VI,
Appellant's Brief).

This argument would have this Court stretch

principals of application of law and determination of public policy
to ridiculous extremes.

However, assuming, arguendo, that the

provisions of 12 U.S.C. Section 1972 are applicable to this
situation, the terms of the committment letter are, nonetheless, not
in violation of the Act as the cases interpreting the same indicate.
Merrill Bean overlooks the language of the statute itself
which provides specific exceptions for the type of arrangements
found in this case.

What the statute provides is that "a Bank shall

not in any manner extend credit . . . on the condition or
requirement . . . (C) that the customer provide some additional
credit, property, or service to such bank, other than those related
to and usually provided in connection with a loan, discount,
deposit, or trust service" (emphasis added).
Initially, the record is clear that the Bank did not, by any
interpretation, condition the extention of credit on any other
business; a 7% mortgage loan was made without any mention of demand
deposit accounts or automobile dealer paper.

Further, the

l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of the 1970 amendment t o t h e Bank Holding
Company Act leaves no doubt t h a t Congress s p e c i f i c a l l y intended t o
exclude from the anti-tie-down provisions t h e type of arrangements
present in t h e i n s t a n t case.

The record of the L e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y

informs us as follows:
The Senate Anti-Tie-in provision was amended on the floor
of the Senate"to exclude from its coverage certain specific
so called traditional banking servicesf i.e. loans,
discountsf depositsf and trust services. Conference Report
No. 1747. 91st Congress, Second Session (1970f page 29).
In the same legislative sessionf Congress further provided a
specific description of the purpose of the 1970 amendment:
The purpose of this provision (12 U.S.C. Section 1972) is
to prohibit anti competitive practices which require bank
customers to accept or provide some other service or product
or refrain from dealing with other parties in order to obtain
the bank product or services they desire. The provision
authorizes the Federal Reserve Boardf by regulation or order,
to permit such exceptions to the prohibitions of the section
as the Board considers will not be contrary to its purposes
and the Committee expects that by such regulation or order
that Board will continue to allow appropriate traditional
banking practices, (emphasis added).
The statute was not designed to interfere with traditional
banking practices or attempts by banks to protect their investment.
Nesglow, Inc. vs. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 506 F. Supp. 254
(1980).

The purpose of Section 1972 is to prevent banks from

conditioning the granting of credit on unrelated compensating
business such as requiring the prospective borrower to buy a parcel
of foreclosed owned real estate along with the loan. The Section is
not designed to exclude practices which directly protect the bank's
investment in the particular loan.

Federal Courts presented with the precise s i t u a t i o n found in
the i n s t a n t case have uniformly held t h a t these types of
arrangements do not v i o l a t e the provisions of the Sherman Anti Trust
Act or the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970. In a case d i r e c t l y on
point f S t e r l i n g Coal Company I n c . v s . United American Bank of
Knoxville, 470 P. Supp. 964 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (a copy being included
as Appendix "A-7 , , ) f the Court held t h a t no v i o l a t i o n of the Bank
Holding Company Act amendments of 1970 occurred by the bank's
conditioning t h e grant or extention of c r e d i t to a closely held
corporation upon t h e requirement t h a t the bank supervise and control
the c o r p o r a t i o n ' s checking account and other corporate a f f a i r s f
including veto power over purchases and payment of dividends and
t h a t the corporation guarantee the personal indebtedness of two of
i t s sole stock h o l d e r s .

The bank in S t e r l i n g Coal exercised

s u b s t a n t i a l l y more control over the a f f a i r s of the S t e r l i n g Coal
Company than did Commercial Security Bank over Merrill Bean
Chevrolet in t h e i n s t a n t case.

In t h i s matter, a l l Commercial

Security Bank did was t o grant Merrill Bean Chevrolet an i n c e n t i v e
to maintain i t s corporate checking account a t the Bank in order to
r e a l i z e a more favorable 6 1/2 percent r a t e under an already
favorable 7 percent loan.

Unlike the s i t u a t i o n found in S t e r l i n g

Coal, the Bank exercised no control whatsoever over expenditures
from the Merrill Bean Chevrolet account or the d i s p o s i t i o n of debts
of i t s stockholders f although the Court in S t e r l i n g Coal held t h a t
circumstances of much greater bank control of the borrower's a f f a i r s
did not offend t h e provisions of 12 U.S.C. Section 1972.

In another case f summary judgment was granted t o the banking
i n s t i t u t i o n where the p l a i n t i f f borrower alleged t h a t requiring them
to e s t a b l i s h an i n t e r e s t free escrow tax account c o n s t i t u t e d an
i l l e g a l t i e - i n arrangement under 12 U. S.C. Section 1972.

Bass v s .

Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, D i s t r i c t Court or Massachusetts,
September 28 f 1979, CCH Decisions, Paragraph 98.261 (1979-1980
Edition).
The case r e l i e d upon by Merrill Bean Chevrolet a t page 16 of
i t s Brief, Costner v s . Blount National Bank of Marysville,
Tennessee, 578 F. 2d. 1192 (6th Cir. 1979) , i s i n a p p l i c a b l e to the
i n s t a n t case in several r e s p e c t s .

F i r s t , the Costner case i s a

damages case only and does not make any findings or conclusions as
t o a n t i - t i e - i n provisions since the defendant bank conceded a
v i o l a t i o n of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970 prior to arguing
i t s appeal. 578 F. 2d a t 1192.
In order to lend creedance to i t s argument t h a t the Bank's
p r a c t i c e s c o n s t i t u t e d an unlawful tying arrangement, Merrill Bean
argues under Point I of i t s Brief t h a t a l l other banks in t h e Ogden
area required t h e same conditions and compensating business for the
purchase of automobile dealer paper and t h e r e f o r e Merrill Bean was
l e f t without a choice but t o move i t s checking account when t h e Bank
would no longer buy i t s paper. Merrill Bean further argues under
Point I of i t s Brief t h a t since t h i s appeal i s taken from a summary
judgment t h a t t h i s Court, in construing t h e f a c t s in t h e l i g h t most
favorable to i t , must assume t h a t a s s e r t i o n t o be t r u e .

However,

James Merrill Bean himself, in h i s deposition, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had
no evidence whatsoever t h a t the Bank p a r t i c i p a t e d in an unlawful

arrangement in respect to these conditions*

Beginning at page 54 of

his deposition, James Merrill Bean the examination proceeded as
follows:
Q: Let me ask you the further question; do you acknowledge
that on or prior to July 19f 1967, the date of that
agreement, that Commercial Security Bank actually conspired
or had an agreement with other banks in the area to impose
these types of conditions? Do you have any facts that would
lead you to that conclusion?
A:

No.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e a n t i - t r u s t
e n t i r e l y appropriate.

i s s u e s was

Although t h i s Court must c o n s t r u e t h e f a c t s

i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e A p p e l l a n t ,

i t need n o t a c c e p t

f a c t s c o n t r o v e r t e d by t h e R e s p o n d e n t ' s own w i t n e s s .

The law under

which M e r r i l l Bean makes i t s most v o c a l c l a i m , 12 U . S . C . S e c . 1 9 7 2 ,
was n o t i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e t h e t r a n s a c t i o n was consummated;
further,

even when both t h e Bank and t h e t r i a l

Court i n d u l g e d

M e r r i l l Bean, a r g u e n d o , i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of S e c t i o n 1 9 7 2 , t h e
s t a t u t e and c a s e s i n t e r p r e t i n g i t f a i l e d t o s u s t a i n i t s p o s i t i o n .
POINT THREE
THE BANK DID NOT RENDER MERRILL BEAN CHEVRLOET'S PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE CONTRACT IMPOSSIBLE AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL
CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
An a d d i t i o n a l t h e o r y of d e f e n s e advanced by M e r r i l l Bean was
t h a t t h e B a n k ' s w i t h d r a w a l from t h e d e a l e r paper market r e n d e r e d t h e
a b i l i t y of M e r r i l l Bean t o perform i n such a manner a s t o
t h e 6 1 / 2 lower r a t e i m p o s s i b l e and, t h e r e f o r e ,

realize

such s h o u l d e x c u s e

M e r r i l l Bean from t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o pay a t t h e 7 p e r c e n t

rate.

The fundamental inaccuracy stated throughout Merrill Bean's
Brief and at the District Court, both generally and as to the
impossibility argumentf is the characterization of the movement of
the rate from 6 1/2 percent to 7 percent as an increase in the
interest rate.

This is inaccurate because the loan was a 7 percent

loan from its inception, as stated in the Trust Deedf the Trust Deed
Notef and the July 19, 1967 Committment Letter, and simply provided
a method by which Merrill Bean could realize a lower rate by
maintaining certain other business with the Bank.

Therefore, the

loan was not "increased" but was rather returned to its original
face rate when Merrill Bean withdrew its other banking business.
This distinction in terms is important as Merrill Bean construes the
rate change in the nature of a penalty rather than a return to the
original loan rate.
As argued hereinabove and specifically in reference to the
auto dealer agreement between the parties dated January 1, 1966f
(Deposition of James Merrill Beanf Exhibit 2), the Bank had the
contractural right to refuse to purchase dealer paper from Merrill
Bean with or without cause? also, Merrill Bean was under no
obligation to offer any specific amount of dealer paper to the Bank.
Merrill Bean mistakenly argues in its Brief that the Bank had
committed itself to the purchase of Merrill Bean Chevrolet dealer
paper by contract and by subsequent course of dealing.

However,

this position is clearly erroneous as Merrill Bean is unable to cite
to this Court any contract or agreement to that effect beyond
assertions of course of dealing simply because no such agreement
ever existed.

Conversely, the existence of the written dealer

agreement dated January lf 1966 defeats Merrill Bean's impossibility
of performance and course of dealing defenses.

In Morton Buildings,

Inc., vs. Department of Human Resources, 695 P. 2d 450 (Kan. 1985),
the Court stated:
. . . it is generally acknowledged that non-performance of a
condition may not be excused when the actions taken by the
party allegedly hindering the performance are actions
permitted by the contract. 695 P. 2d at 452. (emphasis
added).
Merrill Bean argues that withdrawal from the purchase of
dealer paper was a breach on the part of the Bank; howeverf the
withdrawal of the same was a sound business decision by the Bank
and, in any event, constituted

M

. . . actions permitted by the

contract . . . M Id.
It is also interesting to note that, again, in spite of the
plethora of affirmative defenses raised by the Answer, Merrill Bean
admitted in its Answer sufficient allegations of the Complaint to
lead to the conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Bank performed
and acted in accordance with the terms of the agreements between the
parties.

This fact can be seen from examining the allegations of

paragraphs 6 and 7, inclusive, of the Complaint, (Record on Appeal
at 2) all of which were unconditionally admitted by Merrill Bean in
its Answer (Record on Appeal at 13-19).
To illustrate the facts which were established as of record
due to the admissions of the Answer, it is important to go back to
the operative language of the loan commitment letter which is in
issue in this action, the authenticity of which has been admitted in
the Answer by virtue of the admission of the allegations of

paragraph 3 of the Complaint*

Again, that provision states:

The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to
6.5% in consideration of the maintenance by you of your
commercial checking account with the Bank and the offering by
you to its Bankloan Department of new and used automobile and
truck contract which meet the lending policy of said Bank.
(emphasis added) (See Appendix A-2 hereof).
Merrill Bean ignores the fact that the reduced 6.5% interest
rate was available only if the purchase of automobile and truck
contracts met the lending policy of the Bank.

Because the Bank

elected to discontinue the business of purchasing dealer

contracts

from Merrill Beanf those dealer contracts thereafter failed to "meet
the lending policy of said Bank as a matter of common definition."
Such a decision by a lender is inherently a change in "lending
policy."

In Answer to paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Merrill Bean

admitted that in January of 1970 it withdrew all accounts and other
banking business from the Bank. As the loan commitment letter
clearly indicates, that is an event which would trigger the
application of the 7% rate rather than the reduced 6.5% rate.
By admitting the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Complaint,
Merrill Bean admitted that the Bank acted within the rights it had
under

the loan commitment contract.

Paragraph 7 of the Complaint

(Record on Appeal at 2) provides as follows:
7. Effective on or about January of 1970 and in pursuance of
the terms of the July 29, 1967. commitment letter, as above
alleged and pursuant to the defendants withdrawal of all of
its accounts and the banking business from the plaintiff
Bank, the plaintiff increased the interest rate payable on
said loan balance to the rate of 7% from the then existing
6.5% rate." (emphasis added).

Merrill Bean thereby admits that the change in the interest
rate was "in pursuance of the terms of the July 19, 1967, commitment
letter."
As argued abovef the Bank did not act in such a manner as to
make performance under the contract impossible for Merrill Bean. The
Kansas Court in Morton Buildings, Inc., supra, clearly defined the
quantum of proof required to successfully assert the prevention
defense:

. . . the burden is on the party seeking to take advantage of
the doctrine to prove its application. In addition, the
conduct to have thwarted performance of the condition must in
some way be unjustified . . . the party who has demanded the
condition precedent cannot hinder, delay, or prevent it
happening for the purpose of avoiding performance of the
contract.
Similarly, it is generally acknowledged that non-performance
of a condition may not be excused when the actions taken by
the party allegedly hindering the performance are gctjong
permitted by the contract. 695 P. 2d at 452 (emphasis added).
Merrill Bean failed to present to the District Court facts
which would raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Bank
withdrew from the purchase of automobile dealer contracts "for the
purpose of avoiding performance of the contract (which in this case
is the loan commitment letter)."

In fact, by its admission of

certain allegations of the Complaint as detailed above, Merrill Bean
conceded as a matter of fact that the Bank withdrew from the dealer
paper financing business by virtue of general economic factors
existing in the automobile business at that time.

This results in

the establishment of a fact which is exactly opposite to a necessary
element of the impossibility defense; that is, that the Bank

withdrew from the dealer paper business for the specific purpose of
avoiding performance of the contract with Merrill Bean Chevrolet,
A Utah case on point shows that Merrill Bean could not, if
given a trial, prevail on any claim of prevention of performance.
This is due to the fact that this Court has required proof of a high
degree of willfulness and conduct aimed specifically at avoiding or
preventing performance of a particular contractural relationship.
In Weber Meadow View Corporation vs. Wilde, 575 P. 2d 1053 (Utah
1978), this Court explained this high standard based on a factual
scenario similar to that found in the instant case:

One who enters into a contract must cooperate in good faith
to carry out the intention of what the parties had in mind
when it was made; and that he should not be permitted to
engage in any subterfuge or devious means to prevent the
other from performing and then use that as an excuse for
failing to keep his own commitment. The significant fact
here is that the plaintiff makes no claim that there is any
such subterfuge or collusion. In response to the Courts
question, its counsel expressly stated that it did not claim
any collusion or bad faithf which it will be notedf is in
conformity with the omission of any such contention in the
stipulated facts above recited. 575 P. 2d at 1058 (emphasis
added).
In two additional cases, this Court held that the party
invoking the prevention of performance defense must show that the
other party to the contract acted in a willful manner to prevent the
performance of the particular contractural relationship.

Reed vs.

Alvie, 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Cahoon vs. Cahoon, 641 P. 2d 140
(Utah 1982).

The facts established as a matter of record in this case take
away from Merrill Bean the ability to prove as a matter of law or
fact that the Bank acted willfully or through subterfuge or
collusion to prevent Merrill Bean from performing in such a manner
as to realize the lower 6.5% interest rate under the terms of the
loan commitment letter.

On the contraryf by admitting that the Bank

withdrew from purchase of its dealer contracts as a matter of Bank
policy and due to economic and business conditions in the automobile
industry, Merrill Bean painted a factual scenario which is the
precise opposite of any supportable allegation of conspiracy,
subterfuge, or willful conduct on the part of the Bank.

The ruling

of this Court in Weber Meadowview Corporation combined with the
established facts of record in this case bars the ability of Merrill
Bean under any interpretation of those facts to make a case under
the defense of prevention of performance if afforded a trial, and
the District Court properly so held. Merrill Bean necessarily
advances the position that this transaction consisted of a 6.5% loan
which was later raised to 7%; such is not the case.

This particular

transaction consisted of three written documents, specifically, the
Deed of Trust, the Trust Deed Note, and the loan commitment letter.
The Trust Deed Note is stated at a 7% interest rate and the Trust
Deed itself does not contain a discount clause.

Further, the loan

commitment contract states on the first page that this is a 7% loan
and merely provides an incentive toward the end of the contract to
lower the rate to 6.5% rate if other business is maintained.

The

Bank reserved the right to purchase dealer contracts only if the
same met the "lending policy of said Bank."

Certainly, no

r e s p o n s i b l e f i n a n c i n g i n s t i t u t i o n would g u a r a n t e e t o p a r t i c i p a t e

in

a c e r t a i n t y p e of b u s i n e s s over a l e n g t h y p e r i o d of time which may
not always meet i t s l e n d i n g p o l i c i e s which f

of c o u r s e , w i l l change

from time t o time due t o p r e v a i l i n g economic c o n d i t i o n s beyond t h e
c o n t r o l of t h e Bank.

Therefore, the D i s t r i c t Court's ruling t h a t

t h e B a n k ' s conduct did not make performance of t h e c o n t r a c t by
M e r r i l l Bean i m p o s s i b l e was proper as t h e c o n t r a c t p e r m i t t e d t h e
Bank, by i t s t e r m s , t o a c t a s i t

did.

POINT FQTO
MERRILL BEAN'S PRINCIPAL DEFENSES ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE
OF INTEGRATION AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
As the foregoing statement of Facts, the Deposition of James
Merrill Bean, and the operative documents indicate, the transaction
in issue in this action was reached between sophisticated commercial
parties, was a transaction which was completely reduced to signed
written instruments (prepared and reviewed with advice of counsel)
and was a transaction concerning real property interests.
It is the stated position of Merrill Bean that it was
entitled to a 6 1/2% interest rate on the Note and Deed of Trust
over the entire life of the loan rather than the 7% rate provided in
the instruments.
of Defendant).

(Deposition of J. Merrill Bean at page 47; Answer
However, the stated evidentiary basis of this

defense clearly shows that it is barred by the doctrine of
integration and the statute of frauds.

At page 47 of his

deposition, James Merrill Bean testified as follows:

"Q: I s n ' t i t f in fact f your p o s i t i o n t h a t t h i s note and t r u s t
deed should have amortized a t six and a half percent over i t s
entire life?
A:

Yes,

Q:

Upon what do you base t h a t conclusion?

A: The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t were made to me by o f f i c e r s of
the Bank p r i o r to my going in to sign the loan agreement,"
(emphasis added).
Thus, although Merrill Bean's President admits t h a t the Note f
Trust Deed and Loan Commitment Letter a l l s t a t e d a 7% i n t e r e s t r a t e f
Merrill Bean's key defensive a s s e r t i o n i s based upon alleged oral
n e g o t i a t i o n s conducted p r i o r to the execution of the loan documents.
On t h i s b a s i s , the Bank was e n t i t l e d to the summary judgment as a
matter of law as the loan documents are i n t e g r a t e d c o n t r a c t s ,
barring Merrill Bean's advancement of defenses based on

parole

evidence of pre-execution oral n e g o t i a t i o n s .
In order to prove i t s case f Merrill Bean attempted and now
attempts t o introduce parole evidence outside of the terms of the
loan documents.

That i s f i t attempts to show t h a t the loan

c o n t r a c t s between i t and the Bank a r e not fully

integrated

agreements in t h e aspect of the s t a t e d r a t e of i n t e r e s t .

In

essence, Merrill Bean i s attempting t o b o o t s t r a p i n t o the agreements
a d i f f e r e n t r a t e of i n t e r e s t than i s expressly s t a t e d t h e r e i n .

The

D i s t r i c t Court properly found t h a t the loan documents are fully
i n t e g r a t e d c o n t r a c t s , A general statement of the law with respect t o
t h i s issue i s found a t Eie v s . Saint Benedict's Hospital, 638 P. 2d
1190 (Utah 1981) r where t h i s Court held;

The general rule is that in the absence of fraudf an
apparently complete and certain agreement which the parties
have reduced to writing will be conclusively presumed to
contain the whole agreement; and that parole evidence of
contemporaneous conversationsf representations or statements
will not be received for the purpose of varying or adding to
the terms of the written agreement. The foregoing general
rule applies only to integrated contracts. Whether the
parole evidence is admissible therefore, depends on whether
we are dealing with an integrated writing. 638 P. 2d at 1194.
The criteria to be applied in determining whether particular
subject matter was intended to be covered by an agreement has been
stated by this Court as follows:
In deciding upon this intent, the chief and most satisfactory
index for the judge is found in the circumstances whether or
not the particular element of the alleged extrinsic
negotiations is dealt with at all in the writing. If it is
mentioned, covered or dealt with in the writing, then
presumably the writing was meant to represent all of the
transactions on that element . . .
Alexander vs. Brown, 646 P. 2d 692, 694 (Utah, 1982) (quoting
Farr vs. Wasatch Chemical Company. 143 P. 2d 281, 283 (Utah 1943)).
Evidence varying the terms of contract is admissible only if it is
necessary to clarify an ambiguity in the terms of a written
agreement.

Rowley vs. Marrcrest Homeowners Association, 6 56 P. 2d

414, 417 (Utah, 1982) .
Merrill Bean clearly understood the interest rate being
charged on the loan as the rate is clearly and unambiguously stated
in the loan committment letter, the Trust Deed, and the Note, as
admitted in his deposition testimony:

"Q: All right. Again, my question would be, that was
offered as a 7 percent loan, wasn't it?
A: That paper (Exhibit 5) is written as a 7% loan . . .
(Deposition at P. 23) (paranthetical comment added).

Furtherf Mr, Bean knew what the defendant needed to do to
realize the lower 6 1/2 % incentive rate provided in the July 19,
1967 Committment Letter:

M

Q: Now in terms of the practical and logistical
considerations provided in that clause, what was your
understanding of what you needed to keep with Commercial
Security in order to keep that lower rate?
A: The company checking account to be maintained at the
bank,
Q: At that time, did you have any objection to maintaining
your commercial checking account with Commercial Security
bank?
A: No.
( D e p o s i t i o n a t p . 30) •
Mr, Bean was e n t i r e l y c l e a r on t h e unambiguous meaning of t h e
terms of t h e a g r e e m e n t s , y e t a d m i t s , i n r e c o r d t e s t i m o n y , t o breach
of t h e terms of t h e J u l y 1 9 , 1967 Committment L e t t e r which would
allow i n u r e t h e b e n e f i t of t h e lower r a t e :

M

Q: Okay. But i s n ' t i t t r u e t h a t around 1970, though, t h a t
you did withdraw your compensating b a l a n c e a c c o u n t s , for
example, your commercial checking a c c o u n t ?
A: I d o n ' t know if t h e d a t e i s a c c u r a t e , b u t , y e s , I took my
checking account out of Commercial S e c u r i t y Bank."
( D e p o s i t i o n a t page 4 7 ) .

Regarding a term of an agreement such as an interest ratef it
would be patently illogical to find an ambiguity where such a term
is plainly stated as a readily identifiable digit.

The first

paragraph of the Loan Committment Letter specifies the rate as do
the Note and Trust Deed; the rate is clearly stated in an
unmistakable form.

And the above-cited deposition testimony clearly

shows Mr, Bean was well aware of the termsf the meaning thereoff and
the inclusion of that subject matter into the written instruments.
Merrill Bean's defenses which are based upon pre-contract
oral negotiations are also barred by the Statute of Frauds as the
transaction which is the subject of the instant case consists of the
taking of " . . . trust or power over or concerning real property .
. . " UTAH CODE ANN. Section 25-5-1, as amended.

Further, the

transaction was not to be performed within one (1) year and thus the
oral evidence advanced by defendant contradicting the terms is
barred. UTAH CODE ANN.

Section 25-5-4 (1) , as amended.

The purpose

of the Statue of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury regarding
matters which the law deems would be in writing to be enforceable.
Bently v. Potter. 694 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1984).

The District Court

properly afforded the written agreements between the parties full
force and effect according to their terms and prevented Merrill Bean
from cluttering the record with assertions which could not be
supported by admissible evidence at trial.

The decision of the D i s t r i c t Court awarding judgment as
prayed was e n t i r e l y proper under the f a c t s of t h i s case and t h e law
applicable t h e r e t o .

The Bank acted in accordance with clear terms

of fully i n t e g r a t e d agreements which Merrill Bean sought to
controvert only with inadmissible parole evidence.

The Bank's

requirement t h a t Merrill Bean merely maintain i t s commercial
checking account with the Bank t o enjoy a one-half percent reduction
of an already favorable r a t e did not v i o l a t e the Bank Holding
Company Act because the Act was not in effect in 1967; in any event f
such arrangements a r e exempted t r a d i t i o n a l banking r e l a t i o n s h i p s
under the s t a t u t e and cases i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e same such t h a t Merrill
Bean's defense thereunder i s without merit even assuming, arguendo>
t h a t the Act a p p l i e s here. Further, James Merrill Bean admitted
under oath to having no evidence of any conspiracy or unlawful
combination involving t h e Bank.
The record in the D i s t r i c t Court and t h e law properly
applicable to the f a c t s of t h i s case lead t o the conclusion t h a t the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i s sound and fully supported by the lawf
f a c t s and competent evidence presented. The Bank t h e r e f o r e requests
t h a t t h i s Court affirm the Judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court.
DATED t h i s

/

~* day of Mayf 1987.
Respectfully

submitted f

^ - J e j E E r e ^
A t t o r n ^ / t e J r Respondent

MAILING CERTIFICATE

X

I hereby certify that on the _
day of May^ 1 9 8 7 ,
I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of t h e f o r e g o i n g B r i e f t o
the following:
David Bean
BEAN & SMEDLEY
Attorney for Appellant
190 South F o r t Lane, S u i t e
Layton f OT. 84041
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AUTO DEALER AGREEMENT
NON RECOURSE
THIS AGREEMENT entered into at Ogden, Weber County,
Utah, this

1st

day of January

, 19 66

between Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.

, by and

, hereinafter

called "Dealer", and COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, Ogden, Utah,
hereinafter called "Bank", .and is intended to govern the
purchase by Bank from Dealer of motor vehicle installment
sale security agreements representing the sale by Dealer
to purchasers of new and used motor vehicles.
The parties mutually agree as follows:
1. The Bank will purchase from Dealer from time to
time, without recourse, security agreements properly assigned
by Dealer covering the sale of new and used vehicles executed
on forms acceptable to the Bank, and at current rates of
discount from time to time established by the Bank.

Nothing

herein shall obligate the Bank to discount or purchase any
contract from the Dealer nor obligate the Dealer to offer
any contract for sale to the Bank.
2.

The purchase price to be paid by the Bank for each

such agreement shall be the total unpaid contract balance
shown thereon discounted at the rate currently in effect.
The purchase price shall be paid to the Dealer, or at
Dealer's option, credited to his account upon proper execution
of the assignment of the agreement and delivery of the
document to the Bank,

The Bank thereafter shall succeed

to all the right, title, estate and interest of the Dealer
under said agreement*

The Dealer shall furnish evidence

of insurance by a company acceptable to Bank protecting
the Bank and the Dealer as their interests may appear
covering comprehensive and collision ($100.00 deductible
minimum).

The Bank at its option, may procure such

insurance and charge the same against the contract balance.
3.

If the total unpaid contract balance shown on the

agreement at the time of purchase shall exceed the amount
for which such contract was purchased by the Bank, plus the
amount of the discount, the excess shall be credited to the
Dealer18 reserve account with the Bank.

This account shall

also be credited with Dealerfs insurance participations and

charged with unearned insurance

participations

resulting

from

cancellation of policies prior to their expiration dates.
Thereafter on a monthly basis, except as hereafter provided,
and if Dealer be not in default on any obligation to the
Bank, howsoever arising, the Bank shall remit to the Dealer
from the reserve account, the amount by which the credit
balance insaid account shall, at the date of payment, exceed
one-half of one percent (.5%) of the aggregate unpaid balance
of all security agreements purchased from Dealer.

This

reserve account, however, is hereby continually pledged
and assigned for all of Dealer1 s obligations to the Bank,
now or hereafter existing, absolute or contingent including
Dealer's share of any unearned finance charge refunded to
purchasers of vehicles upon prepayment of agreements purchased
hereunder and any finance charge unpaid if a motor vehicle
be repossessed, with the right ih the Bank accordingly to

apply such reserve or any part thereof.
4.

The Bank shall make all collections under agree-

ments which it shall purchase and shall effect repossessions
when necessary, all at its expense, provided, however, that
whenever any of the following shall occur:
(a)

If any agreement purchased by the Bank is in
violation of any law, public policy, or regulation
of any city, county, state or federal governmental
agency or is held to be not legally enforceable
for any reason whatsoever.

(b)

If any of the covenants, warranties or representations made by the Dealer in the assignment of a
security agreement are breached, violated or held
to be untrue.

(c)

If any loss to the Bank shall occur under any
agreement as a result of failure of the Dealer
properly to complete the registration of any
vehicle showing the interest or lien of the Bank.

(d)

If possession of a motor vehicle, the contract or
agreement covering which is purchased by the Bank
hereunder, was obtained by any fraudulent scheme,
trick or device on the part of the buyer thereof

then in such event the Dealer, at the option of and upon demand
by the Bank, will pay to the Bank the unpaid balance due under
the particular security agreement less any unearned finance
charges and the Bank will thereupon reassign said agreement
to the Dealer.

5.

In the event of repossession by the Bank of a

motor vehicle covered by a security agreement purchased
by the Bank hereunder under which the amount of the finance
charge disbursed by the Bank to the Dealer is shown to
exceed two (2%) percent of the price paid by the Bank in
purchasing said agreement, the Dealer upon demand agrees
to repurchase the agreement for the sum of the unpaid balance
due under said agreement, less any unearned finance charge,
upon delivery by the Bank of the vehicle to any place of
business of the Dealer.
6.

All notices, demands or tenders to Dealer referred

to herein may be made in person, orally, or by mail addressed
to the Dealer at his last known address as appears upon the
records of the Bank*
7.

The rights and liabilities of the Bank and the

Dealer as set forth in this agreement, are in addition to
those set forth, or which may be set forth in the contracts,
the assignments thereof, and inrelated documents which the
Dealer may sell, transfer, assign and deliver to the Bank.
8.

If the Dealer defaults in the performance of this

agreement, or any other agreement, representation, guaranty,
or endorsement in favor of the Bank, or defaults in the
payment to the Bank in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the Dealer's obligations to the Bank, then the Bank, at
its election may declare all obligations of the Dealer to
the Bank immediately due and payable and proceed to exercise
its legal rights at such time, place and in such manner as

it may elect and in particular may apply the Dealer's
reserve account to any direct or contingent obligation of
the Dealer in favor of the Bank.
~5T^4)ealer agrees to pay and discharge all costs, and
expenses that may arise from enforcing this agreement or
any rights arising or created hereunder in favor of the Bank,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
10.

The waiver by Bank of any breach or default of

the terms, covenants or agreements of this agreement shall
be limited to the particular instance and shall not operate
as a waiver of any further breach or default of the terms,
covenants or agreements contained herein.
11.

If any provision of this agreement shall be

invalid, the other terms and conditions shall remain in
full force and effect.
12.

This agreement shall be irrevocable until all

agreements purchased hereunder by Bank from Dealer shall
have been paid in full to Bank, and shall inure to the
benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives,
successors and assigns of the parties hereto, and any
company or organization subsidiary to or affiliated with
Bank to whom Bank may assign this agreement and/or cause
to purchase agreements from dealer as herein set forth.
That, except as herein otherwise specifically provided,
Dealer hereby waives notice of non-payment, repossession
and all other notices to which Dealer might otherwise be
entitled by law*

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have caused these
presents to be executed the day and year first above
written*

Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.

CONTRACT PURCHASED TERMS

Maximum
Term

Amount
Advanced

Current year model (new)

36

100% DDCTL

Current year model (used)

36

95% ( Used Car

Previous Year Model

30

90% ( Guide

Rate
kh%
k\%

(

4%%

(

2 & 3 previous year model

30

90% ( Wholesale

5 %

(

f* & 5 previous year model

24

90% ( Value

6 previous year model and older

18

85% (

5%%

(

Minimum service charge $15

—

6 %

Minimum payment $25

If Dealer gives a warranty on automobiles older than previous
year's model, a copy of such warranty must accompany contract at
time of purchase and cover automobile if repossessed.
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SHINCTON BOULEVARD AT TWENTY-FIFTH STREET
P. O. BOX 1480 • OGDEN, UTAH 84402

T^iHra^BI

July 19, 1967

Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.
2626 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah
Attn:

Mr. Merrill Bean

Gentlemen:
Commercial Security Bank, hereafter referred to as said bank, hereby
commits to lend Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. the sum of $400,000.00,
7% interest, for a term of 15 years with a 20 year amortization repayment program. This commitment is subject to the following terms:
1. This loan to be secured by a first mortgage on approximately eight
acres of land located at the northwest corner of Wall Avenue and Harris
Street, Ogden, Utah and improvements to be constructed according to plans
as presented to said bank, upon which said bank made its appraisal.
2. A CLTA Title Insurance Policy issued by &.-.title company acceptable
to said bank, showing good and marketable title with no lien exceptions
other than the bank's first mortgage and current years taxes.
3. The loan of $400,000.00 to be based upon the following ratio: twothirds of the cost of the land and two-thirds of the cost of the improvements. All personal property including office furniture and equipment,
shop equipment, excluding carpets and drapes, will not be considered as
part of the real estate improvements and will have to be paid in cash by
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.
4. Broad form fire and extended coverage insurance, at your expense,
for the amount of the improvements with an insurance company satisfactory
to said bank having a general rating of A and a financial rating of not
less than BBB+ as rated by the Best Insurance Guide of 1966. A certificate
of insurance from such a recognized company will be acceptable, properly
endorsed with a loss payable clause in favor of the bank to insure its
interest.
5. A survey with a plat by a licensed engineer or surveyor of the State
of Utah, showing that all improvements are located on the property and a
Certificate from proper authority showing that the same are built in accor*
dance with the zoning and regulatory authorities.
6. The contractor and the written contract to be approved by the bank,
Performance and payment bonds complying with the laws of Utah and approved
by the bank's legal counsel shall be ftarnished by the contractor and written
by a surety company approved by the bank.
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Me

*11 Bean Chevrolet, Inc.

rag* <.

July 19, iyt>/

7. Disbursements from the loan proceeds for the construction of the
improvements will be disbursed as the work progresses upon written evidence
from the architect stating that said work is performed in a satisfactory and
workmanlike manner and written evidence acceptable to said bank that no liens
or unpaid bills are outstanding at the time of each disbursement. Disbursements
and construction will be also governed by the bank's standard building and loan
agreement which you will be required to sign*
8. The bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to 6%% in consideration of the maintenance by you of your commercial checking account with
the bank and the offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy of said bank. As
further consideration for the above, the bank agrees to waive all fees and
charges in connection with this loan except title insurance, survey, recording
and usual out of pocket expenses in connection with closing and would further
extend prepayment privileges as follows:
After 5 years from date, all or part of the principal of this note may
be paid in advance without penalty. Within such 5 year period, the
makers reserve the privilege, which shall NOT be cumulative from one
year to another, to pay without penalty amounts which are greater, provided
that the extra payments to principal are no more than 20% of the original
principal balance in any one note year. The makers agree to pay a prepayment fee for amounts paid in excess of the 20% as follows: 1% of the
original loan amount if paid during the first 5years of the loan.
9. Written acceptance of this commitment is required within ten days after
date of commitment. Said commitment will expire after sixty days if construction has not commenced on said improvements. Payments on note to commence six
months after date construction begins.
10. It is agreed that paragraph 8 of the bank's standard form trust deed,
pursuant to your request, will be deleted.
Sincerely,

Tordon L. Belnap
Vice-President
GLB/mk

The terms of this commitment are hereby accepted this
1967.
_
Merrill Beah ChevroJ^t, Inc.
/
/

% 7

day of_
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frTMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
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1?f7 SEP 25 PM 3 59

Y\>/

RUTH EAKES OLSEN
3

ragged '/yV^^-y* "'
--cr.pcred ] 2 , Pegs

^

DEPUTY;. ^

^ I ^ A 4 L

B"-

TRUST DEED
With Assignment of RcnU
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THIS TRUST DEED, made this .
__ day of
£u9HSt_
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED, a C o r p o r a t i q n _
between
whose address is
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a C o r p o r a t i o n
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a C o r p o r a t i o n

, as
as
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER
following described property, situated in
Weber
•
County. State of

19 67
as TRUSTOR.
TRUSTEE, and
BENEFICIARY
OF SALE, the
Utah:

A part of the Northwest g a r t e r of Section 5, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, of the Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, United States Survey: Beginning a t a point on the West l i n e of
Wall Avenue 524.9 f e e t North 89° 46' 20 n West and North 0° 58' East 392.0 feet from
the Southeast corner of said Northwest Quarter S e c t i o n , said point being at Ogden City
Engineer's "A" Station 27+94.00 and "B" Station 76+40.20; running thence North 89° 46' 20'
West 691.0 f e e t ; thence North 0° 58* East 5Cl. 5 f e e t ; thence South 89° 46' 20" East 691.(
f e e t ; thence South 0° 58' West 5 0 1 . 5 f e e t t o the point of beginning. Containing 8.0 acr<

///////////////////////
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Together with mil buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way. easements, rents, i
profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or ei
with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT. HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given \
conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such renu. issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness and all other lawful charges evidenced by
mlssory note of even date herewith. In the principal sum of f_4Q0_,0QQ<.0.Q
. made by Trustor, payi
the order of Beneficiary at all times. In the manner and »»th interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or rei
or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained: (*> the payment of su
ditlona! loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a prot
note or notes reciting that they are secured by thU Trust Deed: and M) the payment of all sums expended or advan
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided.

«* »I'd m&lZ
^ o T E C T THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGREES:
j..To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or
t o r a promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon;
/^comply with all law*:" covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to
commit, suffer or permU any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use
of aaid property.may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. If the loan
secured hereby or any-pa'rt thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property.
Trustor further agrees:
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with
plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect aaid property at all times during construction.
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor
under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive alt facts and statements therein, and to act
thereon hereunder.
2. To provide and maintain insurance against such casualties as Beneficiary may require, in an amount, for such term.
and in a company or companies satisfactory to Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in a form satisfactory
to Beneficiary. In<he event of loss or damage. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary. Beneficiary may make
proof of loss and settle and adjust all claims thereunder, applying the proceeds at its option, to reduction of the amount
due hereunder, or to the restoration or repair of the property damaged. Payment of such loss may be made directly to
Beneficiary. In the event of the refusal or neglect of Trustor to provide insurance or to maintain same, or to renew same
in a manner satisfactory to Beneficiary, then Beneficiary may itself procure and maintain such insurance and charge the
cost thereof to Trustor under the provisions of paragraph 7 hereof. Beneficiary shall not be required to accept or approve any policy of insurance or any renewal of an existing policy, which is not delivered to it prior to 30 days before the
expiration date of existing coverage even though the same may be otherwise satisfactory to beneficiary.
S. To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such evidence
of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title Insurance and any extensions or renewals
thereof or supplements thereto.
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said property, or
the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or defend any such
action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable
sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said
property; to pay, when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at
any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof,
may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof.
Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes; Commence, appear in and defend any
action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase.
contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior
hereto: and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may
deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees.
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest
from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be
secured hereby--to^maJteriany-volnntary-'inter-vivoa-tran3fer-of-the---premisee-or-'any~ part thereof without first obtaining the
JfW written consent of the BeneficiaryTTfcnjr-sucb-transfer iJL_tbe_JBe_neficiary shall not so consent, shall constitute a default
/-/_\under the terms of this instrument and the note it secures, and BeneficiaryTnay-cause same lo be foreclosed, and the premises
i sold.- according to-la w—and-the-provisions- hereof.
—__—-—-_-^____™___
-I-L-Tmiznr / x IT IS MUTV.UXY AGREED THAT:
. 9. Should said property or any part thereqf be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation,
awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at Its option to commence, appear in and prosecute in
its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or
damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of
fire and other Insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom
all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute
such further assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee
may require.

fa

10. At any time and from time to time upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of
this Trust Deed and tn* note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby. Trustee may (a) consent to the making of
any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon: (c) join in any
subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey. without warranty.
all or any part of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled
thereto", and the recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Trustor
agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
11. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents,
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon.
Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement
hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to default as
they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease
and Beneficiary shall naive the right, with or without taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents.
royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such
moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to
collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed
to be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
12. Upon default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or
by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver).
and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession
of said property or any part thereof, and in its own name sue or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including
those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable
attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine.
IS. The entering npon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and
the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or
Invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.
14. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver o(
such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
15. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option
of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice o<
default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notie<
for record in each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof is situated Beneficiary also shall deposi
with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby.

8

the lapse of «uch time as may then be required by law following the recordation of saJd noMc* of default
+ "£{ default and notice of sale having been given as then required by lam-. Trustee, -without demand on Trustor!
^ . !.•••'\ %»id property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a mhole or in
„,r-»' Yr parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order
»rV*r£icb such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the higbest
bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the
sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and. In e%ery
such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place last
appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day be>ond the day designated in the notice
of sale, notice thereof shall £e given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The
recitals in the Deed of any matters or fact sball be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. An> person. Including
Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs 2nd expenses of
exercising the power of sale and of sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred by the
Trustee and the Beneficiary but not to exceed ten (10*",<) per cent of the unpaid indebtedness at the time of such sale'with
the minimum total of said fees not to be less than $250.00; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with
such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with
sccrued interest at 1 0 ^ per annum from date of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance
of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place
2 7. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured
hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of
mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses
incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court.
18. Beneficiary m a v appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the' County Recordei
of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named
herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall
be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
19. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees
adminstrators. executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several The tern
"Beneficiary" sball mean the owner and bolder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby In this Trust Deed
whenever the text to requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number include:
the plural.
20. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record a
provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust Deed or o
any action in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
21. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah,
22. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder b<
mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
|#

r

IK WITNESS, ^"HEREOF THE Tmator baa caused these presents to be executed the day and year first above written

.-•I'Uft.rc*^ p \

MERRILL* BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED

!ZP>.\\ *. ^ :

,rr; .P v - t—•—^5^
: :
%
:
t»* i \ ,P1* •- - ^s? ~S

~~"

.—,—+-

INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE of
COUNTY OF
Oa th«

day of —«

the signer

. II

_ . personally appeared before me

of the above instrument, who .duly acknowledged to me that

he

executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing at
My commission expires:

CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE of
COUNTY OF

PTAH
WEBER

j
J «-

Os the

3rd
August
personally appeared before me
J.
day ?f
% u_§l.
J e r r y 3 C < l p ^ ^ ; a d . who being by me duly sworn did say thst they are the
S^cretao^rif^tltSy^of
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED

**V

M. B e a n
president a

corporstion. and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board
Directors, and , " " " . „ J * M « B e a n
and
J e r r y K. W h i t e h e a d
and
eacli
them acknowledge t o a rfre, that aaid corporstion executed the ssme.
^—
*•* ^
v

_

v*
."^

r-S/11771

My Cbnrmissi.on

, f ^ :
/ o: - :

.

r.:r

;

Empire's:

Notary Public ^ /f
Residing at
Oqd6h,

Utah
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400.000,00

August 3

Ogden, Utah .

- 1 9 67

For value received, I, we, or either of ns, promise to pay to COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK of Ogden, Utah, or order.
it its offices in Ogden, Utah, tbe principal snm of
FCUR HUNDRED THOUSAND and NO/100

Dollars,

with interest thereon from the date hereof until paid at the rate of
payable only in lawful money of the United States of America.

2

% per annum, both principal and interest

It is understood and agreed, however, that monthly installments of
3,102,00
THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWO and NO/100

pr>]lB

including interest, shall be paid on this note, the first of said Installments to be paid on the
±~Hi
day of
6 8
J&nuaxy
, is
, and one of said installments to be paid on the
L^j-fr
day of each
and every month thereafter until the
J5th
<jaT 0 f
$$£$$&§*
, 19 J*?_, at which time
the whole of the unpaid principal, together with the accrued Interest, shall be due; each of said monthly installment* to be
applied first to the payment of accrued interest on the unpaid principal, and the balance thereof to be credited on said principal.
After
5
years from date, all or part of tbe principal of this note may be paid in advance without penalty.
Within such
2
year period, the makers reserve the privilege, which shall NOT be cumulative from one year to
another, to pay without penalty amounts which are greater, provided that the extra payments to principal are no more than
2Q
cp0 0 f the original principal balance in any one note year. The makers agree to pay a prepayment fee for
anaonnts paid In excess of the
~
% aa follows:
±
% of the original loan amount if paid during the
first XJOI years of the loan and—**£5!=
% of the original loan amount if paid during tbe next
±2
years.
And in case default be made in the payment of any of said installments of principal or interest at the times and in the
manner aforesaid, then such installment or payment. Installments or payments, so in default, shall be added to and become a
part of tbe principal sum, and from tbe date when each installment should have been paid until it is paid it sball bear tbe
same rate of interest as tbe principal debt, being a part thereof; and at any time during sucb default in payment or in tbe
performance of any agreement, covenant or condition in the Trust Deed securing this note, the bolder hereof, at its option, and
without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and payable.
In the event any Installment of principal and interest shall remain unpaid for a period of 15 days after due. the undersigned, at tbe option of tbe bolder hereof and upon demand, agree to pay as a late charge a sum equivalent to two (2%) percent
of the principal amount of such installment.
If this note be placed for collection, either with or without suit, the undersigned jointly and severally agree to pay all
costs and expenses thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, guarantors and endorsers hereby severally waive presentment for payment, demand, notice of dishonor, protest
and notice of protest and of non-payment of this note, and all defenses on the ground of any extension of the time of payment
that may be given by the holder to them or any of them; and also agree that further payments of principal or interest in renewal thereof shall not release them as makers, guarantors or endorsers.

MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED
BY*

— T z t — J . M. Bean, president
ATTEST *

7S7—Derry K. Whitehead, Secretary-Trea]
Mailing Addressi
Property Addressi
8Truit Deed Note
InaUllmesU including interest.
RE: 70 SM Rer. «/«8

GLB/kf
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE/35F UTAH
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a
Utah banking corporation.
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION/\
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

V

vs.
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
Case No,

95147

Defendant.

Having heard arguments of counsel and having examined
the memoranda on file, I rule as follows:
At the time of the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment I ruled that the Statute of Limitations defense and the
defense

of

laches

were

not

persuasive

to

me

and

I granted

plaintifffs motion for summary judgment on those issues.

I also

found that the documents executed on or about July 19, 1967, were
an integrated contract and that those documents would determine
the rights and obligations of the parties to this action.
Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, loaned $400,000 to
Defendant Merrill Bean Chevrolet/

Inc.f

at 7% interest with a

20-year amortization repayment program.
One of the terms of the agreement provided as follows:

Page 2
Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment
Case No. 95147

"The bank agrees that the interest rate will be
reduced to 6.5% in consideration of the maintenance by you if your commercial checking account
with the bank and the offering by you to its
Bankloan Department of new and used automobile
and truck contracts which meet the lending policy
of said bank * * *•

Subsequent to 1967, the plaintiff discontinued purchase
of defendant's automobile dealer contracts claiming that they no
longer

met

the lending

policy

of the bank.

Defendant later

withdrew its checking account from plaintiff's bank and plaintiff
seeks to enforce the 7% rather than the 6.5% interest rate on the
loan.
The additional amount of payments required at 7%
more than $24,000.

total

There is no evidence that the 7% interest

rate is an unreasonable rate considering the time and circumstances of this transaction.
Defendant

claims

that

plaintiff's

failure

to

accept

defendant's dealer paper caused defendant to shop elsewhere for
banking services and that other banks would not finance defendant's dealer

paper

account to the bank.

unless

defendant

transferred

its

checking

Thusf defendant was forced to transfer its

checking account and plaintiff then increased the interest rate
to 7% on the loan.

Defendant argues that plaintiff's refusal to

accept defendant's dealer paper made it impossible for defendant

Page 3
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for Summary Judgment
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to perform the terms of the contract.
ity

of performance,

equitable

estoppel.

defendant

also

Defendant

also

In addition to impossibilraises
argues

the

defenses

that

the

of

contract

constitutes a "tying agreement" in violation of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1970.
The contract clearly allows the bank to stop purchasing
contracts if the bank determines that they no longer meet the
lending policy of the bank.

I find that the bank has not commit-

ted any acts that violate the terms of the contract.

The issue

then becomes whether or not the contract is an illegal "tying
agreement".
a

The loan on its face is a 7% loan which provides for

.5% discount

under

certain

conditions.

The

contract

also

allows plaintiff to unilaterally determine whether or not it will
accept defendant's dealer paper thus making it difficult, if not
impossible, for defendant to qualify for the discount.
I

find

that

the

fact

plaintiff

has

the

ability

by

contract to unilaterally determine whether or not defendant will
qualify for a .5% discount on the loan interest: rate does not
make

the

contract

defendant, most
Karvville,

a

"tying

agreement".

specifically,

Tenn.,

4578

F.2d

Costner
1192

The

cases

v. Elount
(6th

cited by

Nat, Bank of

Cir.,

1978)

are

distinguishable.

1/1Q
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Plaintiff's
Plaintiff

is

to

motion

prepare

for

summary

findings,

judgment

conclusions

is

granted.

and

judgment

consistent with this decision.
DATED this J > ^ day of September, 1986.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
1986,

a true

Plaintiff's

and

Motion

correct
for

copy

Summary

of

20

the

Judgment

day of September,
foregoing

was

served

following:
Jeffrey W. Shields
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 South Main, Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
David E. Bean
BEAN & SMEDLEY
Attorney for Defendant
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2
Layton, Utah 84041

PAULA CARR, Secretary

Ruling

on

upon

the

August 22, 1986
1

Commercial Security Bank vs. Merrill Eean

THE COURT:

At the very least I will try to narrow

2

the issues to the extent that I can prior to taking others

3

under advisement.

4

i will find as a matter of law that the Statute of Limit-

5

ations defense, defense of laches, are not persuasive to me.

6

And I will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff

7

os those two issues.

8
9

i find that the documents that were executed on or about
July 19th, I am talking about the loan commitment letter

10

and accompanying documentsf are an integrated contract.

11

purposes of this case and this notion, that those documents

12

will determine what the rights and obligations of both parties

13

are.

14
15
16

And foij

That other documents or conversations or discussions leadirj
U P to those are not admissible in evidence.
The primary issue in my opinion is whether or not this is,

1?

or is not, a tying agreement.

i8

estoppel, impossibility of performance, that sort of thing.

19

I think those are all kind of tied tonether, and I should

20

probably consider all of those at the same time in makinc my

21

decision.

22

have a written decision as soon as possible.

23
24
25

Other issues have been raised,

I will take the case under advisement, and I *-ili
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JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948)
Attorney for Plaintiff
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815
Telephone: (801) 535-1054

/// J

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STTE OF UTAH
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a
Utah banking corporation,
FINDINGS OF FACT, AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)
)
)
)

MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET,
a Delaware corporation.

)
)

Civil No. CV-095yJl47

Defendant.

)

Plaintiff,

The Motion for Summary Judgment of the plaintiff having come
duly before hearing before the Court, the Honorable David Roth,
judge, presiding, on the 22nd day of August, 1986, and the plaintiff
having appeared by and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and
the defendant having appeared by and through counsel, David E. Bean,
Bean and Smedley, and the Court having heard arguments of counsel
and having reviewed the briefs submitted by counsel, and having made
a partial ruling from the bench at that time, and having taken other
issues remaining under advisement, and having heretofore made and
entered its written ruling on plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment herein, and being herein advised in the premises, the Court
now makes and enters its;
FINDINGS OF FACT AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, loaned the sum of

$400,000.00 to defendant Merrill Bean Chevrolet on or about July 19f
1967 under the terms of a loan committment letter of that date.
2.

Said loan committment letter of July 19, 1967 provided

for said loan of $400,000.00 at a 7% rate of interest with a 20 year
amortization repayment program.

One of the terms of that agreement

provided specifically as follows:
"The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to
6.5 percent in consideration of the maintenance by you of
your commercial checking account with the Bank and the
offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy
of said Bank * * *."
3.

Subsequent to 1967f the plaintiff discontinued purchase

of the automobile dealer contracts including those of the defendant.
Defendant later withdrew its checking account from the plaintiff's
bank and the plaintiff seeks to enforce the 7% rather than 6.5 %
interest rate on the loan.
4.

The additional amount of payments remaining at the

maturity of the obligation at the 7% interest rate total in excess
of $24,000.00 and as prayed in the plaintiff's complaint.
5.

There is no evidence that the 7% interest rate is an

unreasonable rate considering the time at which this loan was made
and the circumstances under which the transaction was consumated.
6.

Defendant claims that the plaintiff's failure to accept

defendant's dealer paper caused the defendant to shop elsewhere for
banking services and that other banks would not finance defendant's
dealer paper unless defendant transferred its checking account to
that bank.

Thus, defendant argues that it was forced to transfer

its checking account and plaintiff then increased the interest rate

to 7% on the loan.

Defendant further argues that the plaintiff's

refusal to accept defendant's dealer paper made it impossible for
the defendant to perform the terms of the contract.
7.

In addition, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's

refusal to accept the defendant's dealer paper made it impossible
for the defendant to perform under the terms of the contract and in
addition to the impossibility of performance argument defendant also
argues that the plaintiff is equitably estopped from enforcing the
higher 7% rate against it.

Defendant also argues that the contract

constitutes an unlawful "tying agreement" in violation on the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1970.
8.

This obligation is secured by a note and deed of trust

upon the defendant's dealership property whichf by its terms,
affords the plaintiff a power of sale upon default.
Having heretofore made its Findings of Factf the Court, being
duly informed in the premises, now makes and enters its;
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The loan committment letter of July 19, 1967 constitutes

a contract between the parties which allows the plaintiff Bank to
stop purchasing dealer contracts from the defendant if the Bank
determines that such contracts no longer meet the lending policy of
the Bank; the Bank changed policy to discontinue purchase of dealer
contracts from any dealers which it was entitled to do under the
contract.
2.

By terminating the purchase of the defendant's dealer

contracts, the Court concludes that the Bank has not committed any
act or acts which violate the terms of the contract.

3.

Under the terms of the contractf the Court finds that the

plaintiff has the ability to unilaterally determine whether or not
the defendant will qualify for the .5 % discount on the loan
interest rate and therefore, the acts of the plaintiff in
terminating the purchase of the defendant's dealer contract did not
render the defendant's performance under the contract impossible.
4.

The Court finds that the terms of the July 19f 1967 loan

committment letter do not render the contract an unlawful tying
agreement under the terms of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970,
or the Sherman Act.
5.

The note and deed of trust along with the July 19f 1967

committment letter are the three documents which comprise the
entirety of this transaction, and the Court finds that the same are
integrated contracts containing all of the terms and agreements as
between the parties, and the Court therefore does not consider any
other document or communication as modifying the terms of the
agreement stated by said 3 documents.
6.

The plaintiff's complaint is not barred by the applicable

Statute of Limitations.
7.

The plaintiff's complaint is not barred or limited by the

equitable doctrine of Laches.
8.

The plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the sum prayed

for in its complaint, and is entitled to a decree of this Court
allowing it to foreclose the security interest set forth in the deed
of trust which is an issue in this action as a note and a mortgage
and to its attorney's fees and costs of court as therein provided or
by power of sale.

WHEREFORE, having hereinabove made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, judgment shall enter thereon
accordingly.
DATED this

&>

day of December, 1986

BY THE COURT:

David Roth
Second District Judge
ApfSroyed as to

^^y

David E. B e S f P ^
Attorney for Defendant

I Recorded Book JiO •( \

JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948)
Attorney for Plaintiff
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815
Telephone: (801) 53 5-1054
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

>

/Y
\

M

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a
Utah banking corporation,

A

fi

JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
< \

vs.
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET,
a Delaware corporation.

Civil No. CV-095jPTl47

Defendant.

The motion of the plaintiff for Summary Judgment having come
duly before the Court for hearing, the Honorable David Rothf Judge,
presiding, on the 22nd day of August, 1986, and the plaintiff having
appeared by and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and
defendant having appeared by and through counsel, David E. Bean,
Bean and Smedley, and the Court having heard agruments of counsel
and having reviewed the briefs and memoranda of the parties filed
herein, and being duly advised in the premises, and having
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Lav/, and being prepared to rule thereon, it is now by the Court:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That plaintiff is awarded judgment as against the

£>*^..

defendant in the sum of $24,455.16 principal, $5,710.96 of accrued „£•
interest from June 1, 1983 until October 2, 1986 and thereafter -*-^ ^

Pa£057
Indexed

.. •

accruing at the rate of $4.75 per diem and the sum of $222.85 for
advanced costs in reference to said deed of trust;
2.

For the additional sum of $5,000.00 as and for attorney's

3.

For the further sum of $56.75 as costs of Court;

4.

Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose as against the

fees;

defendant that certain deed of trust dated and executed on the 3rd
day of August, 1967 and recorded on the records of the Weber County
Recorder, State of Utah as Entry Number 494442, Book 872, Pages 271
through 273 inclusive for the purpose of enforcing and collecting
the sum of money awarded as judgment hereinabove, the same being
secured by said deed of trust, and the Weber County Sheriff is
authorized by these premises to conduct a sale thereon and to assess
any deficiency thereafter due.
DATED this

/ ^

day of December, 1986.

BY THE COU

r

id Roth,
District Judge
Approved as to form:

^50
David E. Bean
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of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is, therefore, not
entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1977 Supp.).
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
is granted as prayed for, insofar as it is the
Court's findings and conclusions for the reasons herein stated that the defendants' conduct here complained of by the plaintiff is a
violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343(4).

debtedness of its two sole stockholders, but
(2) issues of fact precluding summary judgment existed with respect to claims that
defendant required utilization of defendant's legal counsel, that defendant required
plaintiff to enter into exclusive sales agreements, and that defendant prohibited utilization by plaintiff of banking services at
other banks.
Motion granted in part

IT IS ORDERED that the defendants
herein, and their agents and successors, are
permanently enjoined from permitting, authorizing, or condoning the saying of public
prayers by the students of the Chandler
Unified School District at the student assemblies at Chandler High School, Chandler, Arizona.

1. Banks and Banking *»521
No violation of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 occurred by
bank's conditioning the grant of extension
of credit to new, closely held corporation
upon requirement that bank supervise and
control corporation's checking account and
other corporate affairs, including veto power over purchases and payment of dividends
and that corporation guarantee personal indebtedness of its two sole stockholders.
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments
of 1970, § 106(bX3), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1972(3).

(O I *fyWJHBf*SYSJfJM>

March 29, 1979.

2. Banks and Banking «=>521
Though requirement that certain bank
related to defendant bank provide funds
needed as condition to grant of extension of
credit by defendant bank could amount to
violation of the Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, there could be no
recovery by borrower in absence of any
showing of damage flowing from such requirement. Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1972.

In action under the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, defendant
moved for summary judgment. The District Court, Robert L. Taylor, J., held that:
(1) no violation of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 occurred by
bank's conditioning the grant and extension
of credit to new, closely held corporation
upon requirement that bank supervise and
control corporation's checking account and
other corporate affairs, including veto power over purchases and payment of dividends
and that corporation guarantee personal in-

3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»2487
Issues of fact precluding summary
judgment existed with respect to claims
that bank violated the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 by requiring, in the extension of credit to plaintiff,
utilization of defendant's legal counsel by
requiring that plaintiff enter into exclusive
sales agreement, and by prohibiting utilization by plaintiff of banking services of other banks. Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1972; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56, 28 U.S.
C.A.

STERLING COAL COMPANY, INC.
v.
UNITED AMERICAN BANK IN
KNOXVILLE.
Civ. No. 3-78-330.
United States District Court,
E. D. Tennessee, N. D.

STERLING COAL CO. v. UNITED AMERICAN BANK, ETC.

965

Citeas470F.Supp.964 (1979)

Harold B. Stone, Knoxville, Tenn., for
plaintiff.
W. F. Shumate, Jr., William G. Cockrill,
Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant.
MEMORANDUM
ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.
This is an action under Section 106 of the
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments
of 1970,12 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. Specifically plaintiff alleges that defendant violated
12 U.S.C. § 1972 by placing a series of
conditions upon the extension of credit to
plaintiff. Defendant has moved for summary judgment Plaintiff has filed a brief
in opposition. The record shows that as to
several of plaintiffs claims there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Accordingly the Court grants defendant's motion in part. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
[1] Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated Section 1972(1) by conditioning the
grant and extension of credit upon the requirement Jhat the defendant supervise and
control plaintiff's checking account and other corporate affairs, including veto power
over purchases and payment of dividends.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated
Section 1972(3) by requiring plaintiff to assume the personal liability of its two sole
stockholders and requiring it to pay interest
on the personal loans of one of the two
stockholders. Plaintiff specifically alleges
that plaintiff was forced to borrow $54,000
from a Nashville bank related to defendant,
for the purpose of paying this interest.
The record demonstrates, and there is no
dispute, that plaintiff obtained financing
from defendant at a time at which it possessed few, if any, assets by which to secure
any loans. The principal officer, whose personal liability plaintiff was forced to assume was, along with his wife, the sole
stockholder of plaintiff. Section 1972 was
not intended to interfere with the conduct
of traditional banking practices. Clark v.
United Bank of Denver National Association, 480 F2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.), cert
denied, 414 U.S. 1004, 94 S.Ct. 360, 38

L.Ed.2d 240 (1973); Swerdloff v. Miami National Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Act does not prohibit attempts by
banks to protect their investments. These
requirements, as demonstrated by this record, clearly were connected to the loans
provided by the defendant. While there
are many contested issues of fact in the
record, they are not material to the resolution of these claims. The Court would be
surprised indeed if a bank were to loan
large sums to a new, closely held corporation without obtaining control over its disbursements and without requiring a corporate guarantee of the indebtedness of its
sole stockholders.
[2] Plaintiffs claim that it was forced
to borrow $54,000 from a particular Nashville bank in order to pay interest on a loan
must also be dismissed. While such a claim
could amount to a violation of the Act,
plaintiff has failed to allege or show any
damages flowing from this requirement.
Plaintiff could legitimately be required to
pay interest on the loan to its major shareholder. Unless the further requirement
that a particular bank provide the funds
damaged plaintiff in some way, there could
be no recovery under the Act.
[3] The Court notes that it is granting
summary judgment only as to certain of
plaintiff's theories. The parties will proceed to trial upon plaintiffs theories that
defendant required the utilization of defendant's legal counsel, that defendant required plaintiff to enter into an exclusive
sales agreement with National Energy Resources and that defendant prohibited the
utilization by plaintiff of banking services
at other banks.
For the foregoing reasons it is ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is,
granted in part
_
Order Accordingly.
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it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of
guilt. There is some support for this type
of instruction in the lower court decisions
[citing cases], but the better rule is that
where the jury is properly instructed on
the standards for reasonable doubt, such
an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect
This Circuit has followed the holding of
Holland United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d
987, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Scales, 464 F.2d 371, 373
(6th Cir. 1972).
Defendant Scott has cited a contrary decision of this Court, United States v. LaRose, 459 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1972),
which followed the minority rule expressly
disapproved in Holland. The LaRose Court
cited only one Tenth Circuit case and one
Fifth Circuit case as authority, and reached
a result contrary to Sixth Circuit authority
existing at the time, without citing either it
or Holland. United States v. Luxenberg,
374 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Conti, 339 F.2d 10, 12-13 (6th Cir.
1964), (both Luxenberg and Conti citing
Holland, as well as earlier Sixth Circuit
cases).
Accordingly, the decision in LaRose can
be regarded only as an aberration, and will
not be followed by us in this case.
Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457,
86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), we hold that substantial and competent evidence supported the
jury's verdict. See United States v. Eisner,
533 F.2d at 989-90. The jury was entitled
to infer guilt from the facts in evidence,
and to reject Scott's weak alternative theory of his actions on the night of March 4th
and of his. possession of the stolen money.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

(o
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Paul Kermit COSTNER, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
The BLOUNT NATIONAL BANK OF
MARYVILLE, TENNESSEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 76-2515.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Argued April 7, 1978.
Decided June 29, 1978

Action was instituted to hold defendant
bank civilly liable for violating antitying
provisions of Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970 and Sherman AntiTrust Act. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee,
Robert L. Taylor, J., entered judgment on
verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Merntt, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) whether tying arrangement which occurred when defendant
bank, as a condition to making a loan to
permit plaintiff to purchase stock in an
automobile dealership, required dealership
to sell a substantial share of its commercial
installment paper to bank, was such as to
increase cost of doing business and led,
along with other factors, to decline of business and direct damage to plaintiff was
question for jury, (2) there was sufficient
evidence to justify finding that plaintiff, as
distinct from automobile dealership, suffered direct damage as a result of arrangement and that plaintiff, therefore, had
standing to claim damages, (3) whether a
"not insubstantial" amount of commerce
was affected by arrangement and whether
defendant bank possessed "appreciable economic power" in the market for the tying
product were questions for jun in resolving
claim under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
but (4) e\en if evidence of market power
and effect on interstate commerce was in-
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sufficient to warrant submission of claim
under Sherman Anti-Trust Act, where bank
was also sued under Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, which established a per se rule and provided same
penalties for tying arrangements, but without necessity of proving any economic power in the market for the tying product,
failure to direct a verdict on claim under
Sherman Anti-Trust Act was harmless er-

3. Monopolies s=»28(7.1)
To show a per se violation of antitying
provisions of Sherman Anti-Trust Act, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant
possesses "appreciable economic power" in
the market for the tying product and that
the tying arrangement affects a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied
product Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1 et
seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.

ror.

4. Monopolies «=>28(8)
Whether a "not insubstantial" amount
of commerce was affected by tying arrangement which occurred when defendant
bank, as a condition to making a loan to
plaintiff to purchase stock in an automobile
dealership, required dealership to sell a substantial share of its commercial installment
paper to bank and whether bank possessed
"appreciable economic power," that is,
whether it was able to impose unusual and
burdensome conditions on plaintiff as a condition to granting loan, were questions for
jury in action to hold bank civilly liable for
violating antitying provisions of Sherman
'Anti-Trust Act Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
§ 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.

Affirmed.

1. Monopolies e=>28(8)
Whether tying arrangement which occurred when defendant bank, as a condition
to making loan to permit plaintiff to purchase stock in an automobile dealership,
required dealership to sell a substantial
share of its commercial installment paper to
bank was such as to increase cost of doing
business and led, along with other factors,
to decline of business and direct damage to
plaintiff, was question of fact for jury in
action to hold bank civilly liable for violating antitying provisions of Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 1970 and
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Sherman AntiTrust Act, § 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et
seq., Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1972.
1 Monopolies <s=>28(7.6)
There was sufficient evidence to justify
a finding that plaintiff, as distinct from
automobile dealership in which he held a
substantial stock ownership, suffered direct
iamage as a result of illegal tying arrangement with defendant bank in connection
with personal loan and that plaintiff, therefore, had standing to claim damages from
irrangement in an action to hold bank civily liable for violating antitying provisions
)f Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 and Sherman Anti-Trust Act
Sherman Anti-Tmst Act, § 1 et seq., 15
LJ.S.CA. § 1 et seq.; Bank Holding Compaly Act Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12
U.S.C.A. § 1972.

5. Monopolies «=» 17(2.5)
Plaintiff, who sought to hold defendant
bank civilly liable for violating antitying
provisions of Sherman Anti-Trust Act, was
not required to show that bank had a monopoly or even a dominant position in the
market, but was required to show the type
of "leverage" or economic power which
would allow the bank to raise prices or to
require purchasers to accept burdensome
terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market Sherman AntiTrust Act, § 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et
seq.
6. Federal Courts <s=>907
Even if evidence of market power and
effect on interstate commerce was insufficient to warrant submission of claim
against defendant bank under antitying
provisions of Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
where bank was also sued under Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970, which established a per se rule and
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provided same penalties for tying arrangements, but without necessity of proving any
economic power in market for tying product, failure to direct a verdict on claim
under Sherman Anti-Trust Act was harmless error, particularly in light of fact that
jury charge was in all respects correct.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1 et seq., 15
U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.; Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12
U.S.C.A. § 1972.
Jackson C. Kramer, James A. Ridley, III,
David E. Rodgers, Kramer, Johnson, Rayson, Greenwood & McVeigh, Knoxville,
Tenn., for defendant-appellant.
Norman H. Williams, J. Edward Ingram,
Fowler, Rowntree, Fowler & Robertson,
Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee.

agreement imposed several conditions affecting the operation of the business, including a requirement that the corporation
sell a substantial share of its retail commercial automobile installment paper to the
bank, and that it employ a person designated by the bank to ensure compliance with
the tying arrangement.
On appeal, the bank concedes that the
agreement violated the Bank Holding Company Act. Its major contentions are that
the illegal tying arrangement did not damage the plaintiff and did not sufficiently
affect interstate commerce to constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act. We affirm
the decision below.

The uncontroverted evidence shows that
the automobile dealership experienced financial difficulties, and approximately eighteen months after the loan agreement and
Before LIVELY and MERRITT, Circuit tying arrangement were entered into, the
Judges, and RUBIN, District Judge.*
bank demanded payment of the personal
loan.
Threatened with foreclosure of the
MERRITT, Circuit Judge.
stock he had pledged as collateral for the
loan, the plaintiff assigned his stock to the
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
bank under an agreement which allowed
A jury found the defendant bank civilly
the bank to find a purchaser for the stock
liable for violating the anti-tying provisions
at a price to be determined by the bank in
of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12
negotiations with the purchaser. The bank
U.S.C. § 1972 and the Sherman Act, 15
agreed, in exchange, to make certain payU.S.C. § 1. The Bank Holding Company
ments and to cancel the plaintiffs obligaAct in essence applies the general anti-tytion to pay off the principal balance of the
ing principles of the Sherman Act to the
loan plus another personal loan, for a total
context of commercial banking, by prohibitvalue of approximately $420,000. The bank
ing a bank, when it makes a loan, from
vice president who had handled the plainrequiring in return some business or service
tiffs loan then sold the automobile dealerCo Che bank other than Che usual obligations
ship to a group headed by his brother for a
directly related to ensuring timely repayprice which did not return to plaintiff any
ment of the loan. A damage award of
value above the value of the cancellation of
$60,000 was trebled by the District Court in
the indebtedness.
accordance with both acts.
The tying arrangement was created when
the plaintiff Costner, owner of 50% of the
stock in an automobile dealership, obtained
a $420,000 personal loan from the defendant
bank to buy the remaining stock in the
company. Costner pledged all of the stock
to secure repayment of the loan. The loan

II. CAUSATION
The plaintiffs theory of causation and
damage was that the tying arrangement
increased the costs of doing business and
that this fact, among others, led to the
decline of the business. The decline of the

• Honorable Carl B. Rubin, Judge, United State District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
sitting by designation.
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business in turn put the bank in a position
to call the loan and to force the plaintiff to
sell the business to the vice president's
brother for a price considerably below the
fair market value of the business. The jury
award of $60,000 indicates that the jury
accepted the plaintiffs theory.
The bank agrees that the jury instructions given by the district court were correct, and the bank does not object to any of
the evidentiary rulings of the district court.
The bank argues rather that the plaintiffs
theory of causation and the evidence introduced to support it were insufficient to
permit a jury finding that the illegal tying
arrangement caused damage to the plaintiff.
(1] We have reviewed the record and
the evidence presented to the jury and, like
the District Court, we are unable to say
that the evidence was insufficient to justify
a finding of causation by the jury. There
was evidence that general economic conditions and poor management caused a decline in plaintiffs business, but there was
also evidence that the illegal tying arrangements contributed to the decline. In cases
of this kind, it is for the jury, as the trier of
facts, to determine the question of causation. We cannot say under the circumstances that the jury's verdict was unfair
and should be set aside.
III. STANDING
[2] The bank's argument that the plaintiff has no standing to claim damages turns
on a preliminary finding of fact, and the
district court put that question of fact to
the jury in its instructions:
However, plaintiff would not be entitled
to damages solely upon a finding by the
jury that the tying arrangement resulted in
damages to the car dealership. . . .
If
plaintiff is to recover he must prove that as
a result of the tying arrangement the sale
of his stock in the corporation was for less
than its fair market value at the time. The
injury to the stockholder must be direct and
not merely consequential or derivative
through the corporation. Depreciation in
the value of the stock that occurred before

the sale of the stock because of injuries
directly affecting the corporation rather
than the shareholder cannot be recovered.
The sale of the stock must result in further
loss to the shareholder and not merely substitute the already depreciated value of the
stock for money of equal value.
The District Court apparently gave this
charge to the jury upon the submission of
the bank, and we believe there is sufficient
evidence to justify a finding that the plaintiff, as distinct from the automobile dealership, suffered direct damage as a result of
the illegal tying arrangement See Perkins
v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 89 S.Ct.
1871, 23 L.Ed.2d 599 (1969); Pogue v. International Industries, Inc., 524 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir. 1975).
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT
[3] The bank contends that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant submitting
the plaintiffs Sherman Act claim to the
jury. To show a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant possesses "appreciable
economic power" in the market for the tying product and that the tying arrangement
affects a "not insubstantial" amount of
commerce in the tied product. U. S. Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enterprisest 429 U.S. 610,
611-612, 97 S.Ct. 861, 51 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977)
(Fortner II). In this case, the tying product is credit and the tied product is the
automobile dealership's consumer commercial paper. The District Court gave a full
and accurate charge to the jury, setting out
the elements which had to be proved in
order to find a violation of the Sherman
Act. The bank does not assert that the
jury instructions were erroneous, but rather
that the evidence was insufficient to go to
the jury.
[4,5] We believe it is clear that the
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to
support a finding that a "not insubstantial"
amount of commerce was affected. The
bank's answers to interrogatories show that
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the volume of consumer automobile paper
purchased by the bank from the corporation
during relevant periods was as follows:
DATE
9-21-73 to 12-31-73
1- 1-74 to 12-31-74
1- 1-75 to 2- 5-75

VOLUME
NUMBER
AMOUNT
104
$ 362.509.97
524
$1,855,748.59
41
$ 135,525.34

In Fortner Enterprises v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502, 89 S.Ct. 1252,
22 L.Ed.2d 495 (1969) (Fortner I) the Supreme Court held that even when the total
volume of tied sales amounted to only
$190,000, a not insubstantial volume of commerce was affected.
The question of economic power in the
credit market presents a somewhat more
difficult problem. The plaintiff was not
required to show that the bank had a monopoly or even a dominant position in the
market (Fortner 7, 394 U.S. at 502, 89 S.Ct.
1252). However, the plaintiff was required
to show the type of "leverage" or economic
power which would allow the bank to "raise
prices or to require purchasers to accept
burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market."
(Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 618, 620, 97 S.Ct.
861, 867). Certainly, there is evidence in
the record that the defendant bank was
aBle to impose unusual and burdensome
conditions on the plaintiff as a condition to
granting the loan. The record also indicates that the defendant was one of two
banks in the community that competed for
business with Costner. Finally, it appears
that the plaintiffs efforts during 1973-74
to obtain additional credit or arrange outside investment in the company from other
sources were not successful.
[6] Although the evidence on the bank's
economic leverage was therefore weak, we
are reluctant to conclude that it was insufficient as a matter of law to warrant suln
mission to the jury. However, a definitive
resolution of this question is unnecessary
because we are unable to see how the bank
was prejudiced even if submission of the
Sherman Act claim to the jury was incorrect. The hank was also sued under the
Bank Holding Company Act, which establishes a per se rule and provides the same

penalties for tying arrangements as the
Sherman Act, but without the necessitv of
proving any economic power in the market
for the tying product:
Because of their inherent anticompetitive
effects, which may operate to the detriment of bank customers as well as banking and nonbanking competitors, tying
arrangements involving a bank are made
unlawful by this section without any
showing of specific adverse effects on
competition or other restraints of trade
and without any showing of some degree
of bank dominance or control over the
tying product or service. Moreover, as
individual tying arrangements may involve only relatively small amounts, the
prohibitions of this section are applicable
regardless of the amount of commerce
involved.
[Sen.Rep. No. 97-1084, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1970), [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5519, 5558 (Supplementary
Views of Edward W. Brooke)].
We believe, therefore, that even if the evidence of market power and effect on interstate commerce were insufficient to warrant submission of the Sherman Act claim
to the jury, the District Court's failure to
direct a verdict on that claim was harmless
error, particularly in light of the fact that
the jury charge was in all respects correct.
The verdict would have been the same if
the Bank Holding Company Act alone had
been submitted.
Accordingly, we decline to set aside the
jury verdict in this case and affirm the
judgment of the District Court.

A P P E N D I X

"A-9"

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

25-5-1

CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102)

25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed.
Repeal.
Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L. 1931, ch. 54,
§§1 to 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-4-1 to

33-4-3), relating to the marketing of wool,
repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.

were

CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.
25-5-6.
25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed.
Representation as to credit of third person.
Promise to answer for obligation of another — When not required to be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. No estate or interest in
real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974,
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 33-5-1.
Compiler's Notes.
Analogous former statute, Comp. Laws
1876, § 1010.
Cross-References.
Contract for sale of goods for $500 or more
unenforceable in absence of some writing,
70A-2-201.
Enforceability of security interests,
70A-9-203.
Securities sales, statute of frauds for contracts, 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal
property not otherwise covered, 70A-1-206.
Construction and application.
This section does not apply unless there is
a contract. Skeen v. Van Sickle (1932) 80 U
419,15 P 2d 344.

The meaning of the word "interest" in this
section depends on statutory construction
governed by legislative intent. In re Reynolds' Estate (1936) 90 U 415, 62 P 2d 270.
Sale implies creation of an estate in excess
of a leasehold, by act of the owner. Lewis v.
Dahl (1945) 108 U 486,161 P 2d 362,160 ALR
1040.
Adjoining landowners.
The statute of frauds applies to adjacent
landowners, as well as to persons who are
not so situated. Tripp v. Bagley (1928) 74 U
57, 276 P 912, 69 ALR 1417, distinguished in
10 U 2d 370, 353 P 2d 911.
Agent's authority.
Where, at time agreement for purchase of
land was entered into, there was no statute
requiring agent's authority to contract for
purchase of real estate to be in writing, contract would not be invalidated. Le Vine v.
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rejected written offer. Mendelson v. Roland
(1926) 66 U 487, 243 P 798.
Surrender, release or discharge.
Surrender of interest under contract for
purchase of land could be properly effected
without deed or conveyance in writing in

25-5-4

compliance with statute. Budge v. Barron
(1917) 51 U 234,169 P 745.
Collateral References.
Frauds, Statute of <&= 71 et seq.
37 CJS Frauds, Statute of § 90 et seq.
72 AmJur 2d 616 et seq., Statute of Frauds
§ 59 et seq.

25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the making thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator
or intestate out of his own estate.
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L. Alteration or modification of original contract.
1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 33-5-4.
If original contract, to be binding and
enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of
Compiler's Notes.
frauds, is required to be in writing and subAnalogous former statutes, Comp. Laws scribed by parties sought to be charged, then
1876, §1014; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§2835, a subsequent agreement altering or modifying any of its material parts or terms is also
3918,4219.
required to be in writing and so subscribed,
no part performance or anything done by
Affirmative defense.
such party in reliance on the subsequent
When action is on contract, admitted by agreement being alleged or proved, especially
defendant, he must interpose special plea of if interest in land is involved. Combined Metstatute if statute is to be available as als, Inc. v. Bastian (1928) 71 U 535, 267 P
defense. Abba v. Smyth (1899) 21 U 109, 59 1020, distinguished in 100 U 516, 116 P 2d
578.
P756.
Parties may modify orally an agreement in
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party
relying upon it as a defense. M & S Constr. writing where the original contract is not
required by statute of frauds to be in writing,
& Engineering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank at least where there is consideration for such
(1967) 19 U 2d 86, 426 P 2d 227.
modification. But a contract required by statDefendant, who answered by a general ute of frauds to be in writing cannot be moddenial and simultaneous motion to dismiss ified by a subsequent oral agreement,
plaintiffs claim as being barred under although this rule is subject to many excepsubsec. (2) of this section, proceeded improp- tions, the first great division coming between
erly, since under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of executory and executed modifications.
Civil Procedure, statute of frauds is not a Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc.
ground for motion to dismiss but rather an (1935) 88 U 194, 48 P 2d 489, affirmed on
affirmative defense under Rule 8(c). W. W. & rehearing 88 U 213, 53 P 2d 1153.
An oral modification of a contract required
W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas (1970) 24 U 2d to be in writing, when such modification is
264, 470 P 2d 252.
fully executed, is taken out of the statute. In
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TYING ARRANGEMENTS
AN ACT
To amend the Bank Holding Company of 1956, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970".
• ***••***•**
SEC. 106 (a) As used in this section, the terms "bank'*, "bank holding company",
"subsidiary", and "Board" ha\e the meaning ascribed to such terms in section 2 of the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956. For purposes of this section only, the term "company", as
used in section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, means any person, estate, trust,
partnership, corporation, association, or similar organization, but does not include any
corporation the majority of the shares of which are owned by the United States or by any
State. The term "trust service" means any service customarily performed by a bank trust
department.
[Codifiedto 12 U.S.C 1971]
[Source: Section 106(a) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L. So. 91-607; 84
Stat. 1766), effective December 31, 1970]
(b)(1) A bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell property of any kind,
or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of the foregoing, on the
condition or requirement—
(A) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or service from
such bank other than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(B) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or sen ice from
a bank holding company of such bank, or from any other subsidiary of such bank holding
company;
(C) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or service to such
bank, other than those related to and usually provided in connection with a loan, discount,
deposit, or trust service;
(D)
that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or . rvice to a
bank holding company of such bank, or to any other subsidiary of such bank holding
company; or
(E) that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or service from
a competitor of such bank, a bank holding company of such bank, or any subsidiary of such
bank holding company, other than a condition or requirement that such bank shall
reasonably impose in a credit transaction to assure the soundness of the credit.
The Board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to the foregoing prohibition as
it considers will not be contrary to the purposes of this section.
(2)(A)
No bank which maintains a correspondent account in the name of another
bank shall make an extension of credit to an executive officer or director of, or to any person
who directly or indirectly or acting through or in concert with one or more persons owns,
controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities
of, such other bank or to any related interest of such person unless such extension of credit is
made on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral as those
prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not involve
more than the normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features.
(B) No bank shall open a correspondent account at another bank while such bank
has outstanding an extension of credit to an executive officer or director of, or other person
who directly or indirectly or acting through or in concert with one or more persons owns,
controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities
of, the bank desiring to open the account or to any related interest of such person, unless

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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such extension of credit was made on substantially the same terms, including interest rates
and collateral as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other persons
and does not involve more than the normal risk of repajment or present other unfavorable
features.
(C) No bank which maintains a correspondent account at another bank shall make
an extension of credit to an executive officer or director of, or to any person who directly or
indirectly acting through or in concert with one or more persons owns, controls, or has the
power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities of, such other bank
or to any related interest of such person, unless such extension of credit is made on
substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at the
time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not involve more than the
normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features.
(D) No bank which has outstanding an extension of credit to an executive officer or
director of, or to any person who directly or indirectly or acting through or in concert with
one or more persons owns, controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of
any class of voting securities of, another bank or to any related interest of such person shall
open a correspondent account at such other bank, unless such extension of credit was made
on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at
the time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not involve more than the
normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features.
(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term 4textension of credit'* shall have the
meaning prescribed by the Board pursuant to section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12
U.S.C. 375b), and the term "executive officer" shall have the same meaning given it under
section 22(g) of the Federal Reserve Act.
(F)(i) Any bank which violates or any officer, director, employee, agent, or other
person participating in the conduct of the afTairs of such bank who violates any provision of
section 106(b)(2) shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 per day for
each day during which such violation continues: Provided, That the agency having authority
to impose a civil money penalty may, in its discretion compromise, modify, or remit any civil
money penalty w hich is subject to imposition or has been imposed under such authority. The
penalty may be assessed and collected by the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a
national bank, the Board in the case of a State member bank, or the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation in the case of an insured nonmember State bank, by written notice.
As used in this section, the term "violates** includes without any limitation any action (alone
or with another or others) for or toward causing, bringing about, participating in,
counselling, or aiding or abetting a violation.
(ii) In determining the amount of the penalty the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as the case may be, shall take into
account the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the financial resources
and good faith of the bank or person charged, the gravity of the violation, the history of
previous violations, and such other matters as justice may require.
(iii) The bank or person assessed shall be afforded an opportunity for agency
hearing, upon request made within ten days after issuance of the notice of assessment. In
such hearing, all issues shall be determined on the record pursuant to section 554 of title 5,
United States Code. The agency determination shall be made by final order which may be
reviewed only as provided in subsection (iv). If no hearing is requested as herein provided,
the assessment shall constitute a final and unappealable order.
(iv) Any bank or person against whom an order imposing a civil money penalty
has been entered after agency hearing under this section may obtain review by the United
States court of appeals for the circuit in which the home office of the bank is located, or the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing a notice of
appeal in such court within 20 days from the service of such order, and simultaneously
sending a copy of such notice by registered or certified mail to the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as the case may be. The
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as
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| the case may be, shall promptly certify and file in such court the record upon which the
j penalty was imposed, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. The
findings of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, as the case may be, shall be set aside if found to be unsupported by substantial
I evidence as provided by section 706(2)(E) of title 5, United States Code.
(v) If any bank or person fails to pay an assessment after it has become a final
and unappealable order, or after the court of appeals has entered final judgment in favor of
the agency, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, as the case may be, shall refer the matter to the Attorney General, who shall
recover the amount assessed by action in the appropriate United States district court. In such
action the validity and appropriateness of the final order imposing the penalty shall not be
subject to review.
(vi)
The Comptroller of the Currency, the Board and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation shall promulgate regulations establishing procedures necessary to
implement this section.
(vii) All penalties collected under authority of this section shall be covered into
the Treasury of the United States.
(G)(i)
Each executive officer and each stockholder of record who directly or
indirectly owns, controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of
voting securities of an insured bank shall make a written report to the board of directors of
such bank for any year during which such executive officer or shareholder has outstanding
an extension of credit from a bank which maintains a corresponding account in the name of
such bank. Such report shall include the following information:
(1)
the maximum amount of indebtedness to the bank maintaining the
correspondent account during such year of (a) such executive officer or stockholder of
record, (b) each company controlled by such executive officer or stockholder, or (c) each
political or campaign committee the funds or services of which will benefit such executive
officer or stockholder, or which is controlled by such executive officer or stockholder;
(2) the amount of indebtedness to the bank maintaining the correspondent
account outstanding as of a date not more than ten days prior to the date of filing of such
report (a) such executive officer or stockholder of record, (b) each company controlled by
such executive officer or stockholder, or (c) each political or campaign committee the funds
or services of which will benefit such executive officer or stockholder;
(3) the range of interest rates charged on such indebtedness of such executive
officer or stockholder of record; and
(4) the terms and conditions of such indebtedness of such executive officer or
stockholder of record.
(ii) The appropriate Federal banking agencies are authorized to issue rules and
regulations, including definitions of terms, to require the reporting and public disclosure of
information by any bank or executive officer or principal shareholder thereof concerning any
extension of credit by a correspondent bank to the reporting bank's executive officers or
principal shareholders, or the related interests of such persons.
(H) For the purpose of this paragraph—
(i) the term "bank" includes a mutual savings bank;
(ii) the term "related interests of such persons" includes any company controlled
by such executive officer, director, or person, or any political or campaign committee the
funds or services of which will benefit such executive officer, director, or person or which is
controlled by such executive officer, director, or person; and
(iii) the terms "control of a company" and "company" have the same meaning as
under section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 375b).
[Codified to 12 U.S.C. 1972]
[Source: Section 106(b) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L So. 91-607; 84
Stat. 1766). effective December 31, 1970, as amended by section 801 of title VIII of the Act of
November 10, 1978 (Pub. L No. 95-630; 92 Stat. 3690)t effective March 10, 1979; and sections
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410(f), 424(c), (d)(ll), (eh and 428 of title IV of the Act of October 15, 1982 (Pub. L. No. 97320; 96 Stat. 1520, 1523 and 1526), effective October 15, 1982]
(c) The district courts of the United States have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of subsection (b) of this section and it is the duty of the United States attorneys,
under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to present and
restrain such violations. The proceedings may be by way of a petition setting forth the case
and praying that the violation be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties
complained of have been duly notified of the petition, the court shall proceed, as soon as
possible, to the hearing and determination of the case. While the petition is pending, and
before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary' restraining order or
prohibition as it deems just. Whenever it appears to the court that the ends of justice require
that other parties be brought before it, the court may cause them to be summoned whether
or not they reside in the district in which the court is held, and subpenas to that end may be
seived in any district by the marshal thereof.
[Codified to 12 U.S.C. 1973]
[Source: Section 106(c) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L. So. 91-607; 84
Stat. 1767), effective December 31, 1970]
(d) In any action brought by or on behalf of the United States under subsection (b),
subpenas for witnesses may run into any district, but no writ of subpena may issue for
witnesses living out of the district in which the court is held at a greater distance than one
hundred miles from the place of holding the same without the prior permission of the trial
court upon proper application and cause shown.
[Codifiedto 12 U.SC 1974]
[Source: Section 106(d) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L No. 91-607; 84
Stat. 1767), effective December 31, 1970]
(e)
Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in subsection (b) may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without regard to the amount in
controversy, and shall be entitled to recover three times the amount of the damages sustained
by him, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
[Codifiedto 12 U.SC 1975]
[Source: Section 106(e) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-607; 84
Stat. 1767), effective December 31, 1970]
(0 Any person may sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States
having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by reason of a
violation of subsection (b), under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equit> and
under the rules governing such proceedings. Upon the execution of proper bond against
damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of
irreparable loss or damage is immediate a preliminary injunction may issue.
[Codified to 12 U.SC 1976]
[Source: Section 106(f) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L No. 91-607; 84
Stat. 1767), effective December 31, 1970]
(g)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), any action to enforce any cause of action under this
section shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action
accrued.
(2) Whenever any enforcement action is instituted by or on behalf of the United
States with respect to any matter which is or could be the subject of a private right of action
under this section, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of e\ery private right of
action arising under this section and based in whole or in pan on such matter shall be
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suspended during the pendency of the enforcement action so instituted and for one >ear
thereafter: Provided. That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in respect of a
cause of action arising under this section is suspended under this paragraph, any action to
enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced either within the
period of suspension or within the four-year period referred to in paragraph (1).
[Codified to 12 U.S.C 1977]
[Source: Section 106(g) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L No. 91-607; 84
Stat. 1768), effective December 31, 1970]
(h) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as affecting in any manner the
right of the United States or any other party to bring an action under any other law of the
United States or of any State, including any right which may exist in addition to specific
statutory authority, challenging the legality of any act or practice which ma\ be proscribed
by this section. No regulation or order issued by the Board under this section shall in any
manner constitute a defense to such action.
[Codified to 12 U.S.C 1978]
[Source: Section 106(h) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L No. 91-607; 84
Stat. 1768), effective December 31, 1970]
[The page following this is 6081.]
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